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Special Operation Forces (SOF) have historically operated in the rural 
environment of less-developed countries of the world. The premise of this thesis is that 
current demographics, which indicates a shift of the population to the cities, 
socioeconomic trends, geopolitical factors, as well as strategic, operational, and tactical 
considerations, suggest that the "urban jungle" will be the dominant battlefield as we 
move into the next centwy. Current MOUT and Stability and Support Operations 
doctrine, as well as training, is inadequate to prepare SOF operators for the conduct of 
. operations in the urban environment. 
Three specific case studies - the French in Algiers, the Uruguayan Army m 
Montevideo, and the British in Northern Ireland - are analyzed to demonstrate the 
problems, and the consequences, which occur when a force is thrust into "conflict" in an 
urban environment with inadequate doctrine and training. 
This thesis concludes that without updated, coherent, and integrated doctrine, the 
U.S. military will take an ad hoc approach to the planning of urban stability and support 
operations. This could very well lead to the misutilization of SOF and ultimately the 
failure of the mission. Why? Because the tactical and operational strengths of U.S. 
forces become liabilities in the urban terrain. This thesis concludes by recommending 
the development of an amplifying manual for stability and support operations in the 
urban environment. This would assist not only in planning future urban campaigns in 
conflict, but address roles and missions of SOF in this environment. This may also help 
in finding a proper urban/rural balance in SOF training. 
v 
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[on urbanization trends in lesser developed countries] ... It seems prudent 
for us in the special operations community to monitor and study these 
developments to ensure that our training, modernization, organization, 
doctrine, and leader development sustain their excellence and relevance. 1 
Major General Sidney Shachnow 
A. BACKGROUND 
The premise of this thesis is that urban warfare, or military operations on urban 
terrain (MOUT), should gain an increasing amount of attention among military 
commanders and policy makers as we enter in the 21st Century. A number of recent 
articles in military journals, national security publications, and periodicals, which 
attempt to address the challenges of urban warfare suggest a growing interest in the 
realization of the importance of the urban battlefield. 2 The increased number of urban 
military operations that have been carried out in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union has contributed to the concern for operations in the urban environment. 
Panama City, Mogadishu, Monrovia, Sarajevo, and Port-au-Prince, to name a few, 
suggest that urban terrain will be a prominent, perhaps even predominant, feature in post-
Cold War conflicts. 
1 Sidney Shachnow, "From the Commandant," Special Warfare 6, no. 2 (May 1993). 
2 A cursory list of recent articles include: Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," 
Parameters, 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996).~ Sean Naylor, "The Urban Warfare Challenge," 
Army Times, no. 38 (April15, 1996).; Major General John W. Hendrix," A Perspective 
on Military Operations on Urban Terrain," Infantry, 85 no. 6 (November-December 
1995); LTC T. R. Milton Jr., "Urban Operations: Future War," Military Review, 74, no. 
2 (February 1994).; John Boatman and Barbara Starr, "USA Looks for Answers to the 
Ugliness of Urban Warfare," Jane's Defence Weekly, 20, no.6 (October 16,1993); and 
Brian R. Sullivan, "Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century: The Joint Strategic 
Perspective," Special Warfare, 9, no. 2 (May 1996). 
The corollary of the main premise of this paper is that current U.S. doctrine and 
training for both urban warfare and stability and support operations, 3 are inadequate to 
meet the challenges of urban military operations. This neglect of urban operations has 
already had very serious consequences, not only for conventional forces, but for Army 
Special Operation Forces (ARSOF).4 Mogadishu in early October of 1993 bears sad 
testimony to this fact. This thesis will argue that the Mogadishu debacle was in part the 
result of a divergence between MOUT and Stability and Support Operations doctrine. 
The absence of any doctrinal discussion of integrated or synchronized operations in the 
urban environment between conventional and ARSOF units has resulted in a lack of 
preparedness to undertake MOUT operations. Concurrently, the lack of a coherent urban 
doctrine will result in an ad hoc approach to planning for future urban stability and 
support operations, which in turn, could lead to the neglect or misutilization of ARSOF 
by conventional forces. 5 
3 Stability and support operations are defined in Field Manual 100-20 Stability and 
Support Operations (1996 Draft) as those " ... operations that provide the United States 
government an alternative to war. They are a way to achieve national policy objectives 
without entanglment in an unplanned, undesired, and unnecessary war. They are used in 
peacetime and in the political-military state of conflict, a middle ground that is neither 
peace nor war,either because no other means will work or because the values threatened, 
while important, do not justify the high cost of war." 
4 Joint Pub 3.05 (February 1995 Draft) defines Army Special Operations Forces 
(ARSOF) as " ... active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of 
Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support 
special operations." They include Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, Psycholgical 
Operations, and Army Special Operations Aviation. 
5 Major General William F. Garrison, "The USSOCOM View of Doctrine as an Engine 
of Change," in Richard IL Schultz, Jr., Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and W. Bradley Stock 
eds., Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War, 
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996) 176. 
2 
This thesis will argue that changing demographics, i.e. the movement of the 
populations to the urban environment, especially in those areas where U.S. intervention is 
likely to occur, requires that the ARSOF community give serious consideration to the 
implications of urbanization on ARSOF in stability and support operations. 
1. Scope of the Study 
This thesis will address urban operations that fall within the realm of conflict and 
the doctrine and training that prepares ARSOF to operate in this environment. FM 100-20 
Stability and Support Operations defmes conflict as: 
... a range of political conditions that are neither peace nor war. Conflict is 
characterized by the introduction of organized violence into the political 
process; yet groups in conflict remain willing to resolve their problems 
primarily by political means, with limited military support. The lower 
range of conflict is peaceful, punctuated by occasional acts of political 
violence. At the upper levels, conflict is very close to war except for its 
combination of political and military means. 6 
Counterinsurgency, counter-terror, psychological action/warfare, civil affairs, and 
intelligence collection are the types of activities to be carried out in the urban 
environment. Particular attention will be given to the integration of conventional and 
ARSOF operations, something that is lacking in current urban doctrine. 
6 This current definition of conflict is substantially the same as low-intensity conflict. 
The term low-intensity conflict is no longer used in doctrine. The three states of 
environment used in current doctrine is peacetime, conflict, and war. The term "low-
intensity conflict" is still used in some contexts, as it is prescribed in the Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99-443, Oct 1, 1986, 10 USC 111. See 
the glossary in FM 100-20 (1996), for the complete former definition of low-intensity 
conflict. 
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The decision to study the relationship between doctrine, training, and urban 
operations was triggered by my experience as a Special Forces detachment commander in 
Haiti in 1994. Upon notification that our area of operations would be the city of Port-au-
Prince, a port and capital city as well as the most populated city in Haiti, I immediately 
reviewed current U.S. urban doctrine. I was stunned to discover that practically every 
urban doctrinal publication available to us that dealt with urban operations was written in 
the context of a conventional conflict in Central Europe. This scenario of conventional 
conflict in an urban environment in the context of Central Europe has been rendered less 
likely for U.S. forces with the end of the Cold War. But also, the historical cases selected 
for study in this thesis will show that our approach to urban operations was inadequate 
even at the height of the Cold War. In other words, if doctrine guides military units in 
training and operations, then we should make our urban doctrine reflect the types of 
missions U.S. forces are currently undertaking, and are likely to undertake in the future. 
In the near term post-Cold War environment, no competitor has emerged strong enough 
to challenge the United States on the conventional battlefield, but have, and may well 
continue to confront us in the street and shantytowns of developing parts of the world. 
As I reflected upon time spent training for urban operations, I realized how 
minimal it was. In my experience, any urban training we conducted consisted of clearing 
a few empty rooms and patrolling an empty street with a few block style buildings. This 
training bore no relationship to the conditions that ARSOF discovered in Panama City, 
Mogadishu, or Port-au-Prince. 
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Current urban doctrine is desperately out of date because it focuses on 
conventional urban warfare, reflective of the World War II urban campaigns, and does 
not address those combat and noncombat operations during "conflict." Also, any 
discussion of integrated operations and how to employ SOF in an urban environment is 
absent from FM 90-10. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter ill. 
Second, current doctrine in stability and support operations pays little attention to 
the urban environment. Much of the doctrine and training was formulated during the 
Cold War, specifically during the sixties and seventies, when the major challenge came 
from rural insurgencies. Again, this will be discussed in detail in Chapter ill. 
The Army's keystone doctrine, FM 100-5 Operations, classifies urban operations 
together with mountain, jungle, desert, and cold weather operations under the physical 
dimension of geography. The description of urban operations as a geographical area 
"with a unique set of characteristics" is a good start, but it is the Army's amplifying 
doctrinal manuals that are lacking, along with shortcomings in the training environment. 
In this respect, ARSOF is no different and little consideration is given to urban operations 
as evidenced by doctrinal manuals and training. 
The persistence of this state of affairs has left us inadequately prepared to deal 
with an important operational environment, one which will in all likelihood grow in 
importance in the next century. Conducting operations in the urban environment is 
significantly different than operations in one of the other unique geographic areas. City 
fighting presents unique and complex challenges not only to conventional forces, but also 
to ARSOF. Urban warfare combines all four major elements of the environment of 
5 
combat: geography and weather, while intensely magnifying the elements of terrain and 
infrastructure, not to mention the human dimension of combat. 7 "A city is more than a 
change in terrain on which to apply conventional [or unconventional] tactics ... " writes 
Major Richard Francey. "A city is composed of a system of systems that supports the 
total functioning of an urban area. "8 Each one of these systems are interdependent and 
adds to the operational challenges. The decreased distances (both human and structural), 
of the urban environment add serious constraints and challenges to meet and overcome. 
ARSOF has the potential to be a very effective instrument in meeting the 
challenges brought on by the urban environment. But first we should ask some basic 
questions. What should be the role of ARSOF in the urban environment? What are 
ARSOF's strengths and weaknesses in this environment? Will ARSOF severely have to 
alter its modus operandi in the city? Is the U.S. military prepared to properly conduct 
integrated urban campaigns? 
The premise of this thesis is that the United States is increasingly likely to find 
itself engaged and operating in urban environments in lesser developed regions of the 
world and that Army doctrine, to include ARSOF, has inadequately addressed this 
likelihood. Also, ARSOF' s emphasis on urban training is inadequate to prepare ARSOF 
operators for the urban environment. To better understand the challenges faced by 
7 See FM 100-5, Chapter 14, for a more complete discussion on the environment of 
combat. 
8 Richard Francy, "The Urban Anatomy: The Fundamentals of a City," (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, 1995) 1. This 
thesis analyzes the complex systems and sub-subsystems within the urban environment 
and offers doctrinal modifications for conventional operations. 
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ARSOF in the urban environment, this thesis will examine three cases of armies and 
their SOF , or their elite component in the conduct of urban operations--the French in 
Algiers, the Uruguayan-Tupumaros conflict, and finally the on-going operations of the 
British Army in Northern Ireland. 
The use of non-U.S. examples requires one to define what is meant by special 
operation forces. What we in the United States consider special operations9 and special 
operation forces will look quite different that those of other countries. Perhaps a broader 
definition of special operations or special operation forces is needed when doing a 
latitudinal case study analysis. To many in the U.S. special operations community, the 
French Paras would not be considered a special operation force. To the French, they 
certainly were and are. The same is true for Uruguay. Professor John Arquilla's 
definition of special operations as " ... military (or paramilitary) actions that fall outside 
the realm of conventional warfare during their respective time period"10 may be a trifle 
too broad for this case analysis. Professor Eliot Cohen, noted political scientist from 
9 The Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Pub 3-05 (Draft) defines special 
operation forces as " ... those specially organized, trained, and equipped military and 
paramilitary forces that conduct Special Operations to achieve military, political, 
economic, or psychological objectives by generally unconventional means in hostile, 
denied, or politically sensitive areas. Special Operation Forces conduct a full range of 
military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of general purpose 
forces. Political-military considerations frequently cast Special Operation Forces into 
clandestine, covert, or low visibility environments that require oversight at the national 
level. Special Operations differ from operations by general purpose forces by their 
degree of acceptable physical risk and political risk; their modes of employment and 
operational techniques; their relative independence from friendly support; and their 
dynamic interdependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets." 
10 See John Arquilla's From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modem 
Times, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996) Introductory Chapter for his 
ddefinition of Special Operations. 
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Johns Hopkins University suggests that three criteria defme elite units rendering better 
parameters for these cases. According to Cohen, units are elite when they are 
" ... assigned a special or unusual mission ... only a few men are required to conduct the 
mission and meet high standards of training and physical toughness ... and when it 
achieves a reputation."11 Where the Joint Pub 3.05 definition of SOF suffices for the 
U.S. case, it is probably not applicable to many foreign armies. Hence, Cohen's 
definition will be applied to the French, Uruguayan, and British cases. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
To better understand the problems facing today's military, particularly ARSOF, in 
conducting operations in an urban environment, I will use the case study methodology. I 
will look at three historical cases and conduct an analysis of each. History is rich with 
examples of urban warfare and fighting in what we would categorize as total war. 
However, the focus of the cases in this thesis will be on urban fighting that falls within 
the "conflict" state of environment. The cases were selected both because of the type of 
geographical environment in which fighting took place, and the nature of the threat. 
The thesis will seek to analyze the elements which led to the success or failure of 
urban operations during "conflict." 
11 Eliot A Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modem 
Democracies, (Harvard: Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 1978) 17. 
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1. Case Selection 
When using the comparative case method of analysis, there will always be 
questions raised as to the case selection and whether the cases presented offer a tough 
and proper test for the analysis being done. My preference would have been to analyze 
those cases of urban operations in low-intensity conflict since the end of the Cold War. 
But as many of the conflicts and operations are ongoing, data is incomplete and outcomes 
uncertain. Although the Northern Ireland conflict is far from resolved, its long duration 
allows one to gain a perspective on the effectiveness of operations there. Therefore, 
more distant examples allow one to draw more complete conclusions based on the post-
Cold war historical cases of urban operations in low-intensity conflict. 
This thesis does not aim to provide exhaustive historical narratives of the three 
urban operations analyzed. Rather, is seeks to use them as a framework to examine the 
variables of doctrine and training. Each case begins with a brief historical perspective of 
the confrontation, followed by the background information which focuses the reader on 
the specific conditions of urban operations. The two variables of doctrine and training 
will then be examined in detail-the doctrine which guided the country's military for 
dealing with the problem, and how the forces trained prior to the confrontation. 
Adaptations of doctrine or strategies and changes in training in response to the evolving 
conditions during the conflict will be addressed. To achieve this one has to look at 
modus operandi of the insurgents or terrorists and the operations of the counterinsurgent 
force. Therefore since doctrine tells us how an army " .. .intends to conduct war and 
9 
operations other than war ... ,"12 it is necessary to examine the operations and any changes 
in the operations during the conflict. As Clausewitz notes, war is an interactive process. 
Doctrine, like war plans, may not survive the first encounter with the enemy. Finally 
there will be a conclusion for each case that suggest inductive lessons for urban 
operations. 
2. Cases 
The French, Uruguayan, and British cases were selected for some broader over-
arching reasons, as well as some unique individual case qualities, that will be relevant to 
ARSOF in urban operations. Each case falls within the spectrum of "conflict" and 
contains elements of urban insurgency and urban terrorism. The cases differ in both 
duration and intensity. Each supplies different national experiences that provide us with 
unique perspectives and approaches to urban warfare in "conflict." In each case, one 
could question the validity of their doctrine and training in preparing for operating in the 
urban environment. All the cases show that each nation had to wrestle with the question 
of ARSOF and conventional integrated operations and the roles and missions of each. In 
each case, the urban campaign was only part of a larger struggle which also had a rural 
dimension. But it was the urban operations that became crucial to the outcomes. Each is 
a case that falls between the states of peacetime and conflict and contains elements of 
urban insurgency, urban terrorism, and criminal activity. All the cases reflect a 
difference in both duration and intensity. 
12 FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Governnment Printing Office, 1993), 
1-1. 
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Chapter N deals with the "Battle of Algiers" which represents only a small, 
although critical, urban portion of a much larger insurgency. The French case offers an 
example of a conventional European force operating in a Muslim environment with all 
the inherent problems of language and cultural differences. At the tactical level, the 
French proved very effective in dismantling the insurgent infrastructure in Algiers. 
Politically, however, the operation was a disaster, because it helped to alienate both 
Muslim and French opinion, as well as lower France's credibility in the international 
arena. The battle against the insurgents in Algiers points up the dilemma of choosing 
between tactical military effectiveness and political sensitivity. In fact, the two cannot be 
separated. The "Battle of Algiers" offers a brilliant example of how winning the battle 
contributed to losing the war. 
Chapter V examines the Uruguayan fight against the Tupamaros. Like the FLN in 
Algeria, the Tupamaros chose to fight in the city, and indeed developed a strategy for 
revolution which was almost exclusively urban based. The case of the Tupamaros is 
highly relevant because Uruguay in 1960 was experiencing many of the problems present 
in developing countries today: rural flight, rapid urbanization, and a regime which lacked 
the expertise, foresight, or will to cope with the resulting consequences. Unlike the 
Algerian conflict, however, which was fought in the cities, the countryside, and even 
beyond the borders of Algeria, the ten year Uruguayan insurgency was almost exclusively 
an urban conflict. The Uruguayan case also underscores the point security in urban areas 
requires a tight cooperation between the military and police forces. It was precisely the 
11 
breakdown of police functions which led to the arguably disastrous interventions of the 
French Paras in Algiers, as well as the Uruguayan Army in Montevideo. 
Chapter VI addresses the British presence in Northern Ireland. Although Ireland 
itself is not a Third World country and does not replicate the conditions found in urban 
areas in less developed countries, the "Troubles" there have taken root in a relatively 
disadvantaged segment of the population. Northern Ireland also replicates those 
conditions and characteristics found in "conflict:" urban insurgency, urban terror, 
sabotage, and assassination. This conflict's long duration shows how the British were 
able to alter their military operations and tactics to reflect its changing political 
strategies. The British emphasis on specialized urban training and technological 
advancements demonstrate the importance of these in an urban environment. 
C. IDSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
From the earliest times, the city has not been considered a preferred place for 
armies to conduct military operations. It was done so only out of necessity, for the 
challenge of combat in an urban environment are many. As early as 1400 B.C., Joshua 
was perplexed by the nature of the urban environment and how to conduct military 
operations against the city of Jericho. The strategic importance of cities has long been 
recognized, and one's ability to fight in urban areas has often determined the outcomes of 
wars. The three year siege of the city of Syracuse (415-412 B.C.) "became a 'siege 
12 
within a siege' as attackers and defenders changed status, and led directly to the defeat of 
the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War."13 
The Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, recognized the difficulties of urban 
warfare and emphasized the necessity to avoid it due to the high expense in manpower, 
time, and materiel. "The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is 
no altemative."14 British Historian, G.J. Ashworth suggests that although Clausewitz did 
consider the city as another environment in which wars could be fought, he spent very 
little time discussing the characteristics of this unique environment. Ashworth suggests 
that Clausewitz's neglect is an implication that the city is: 
... unsuitable and should be avoided ... and that...the deeply entrenched 
military opinion, that goes back many centuries, that cities are places 
where battles should not be fought. Consequently, when it occurs in urban 
areas, conflict tended to be regarded as an unfortunate aberration to be 
avoided in the future, rather than an example to be analysed so that 
lessons for the future could be drawn. 15 
These attitudes have greatly influenced current urban doctrine and the attitudes of the 
military leadership today. Although history is replete with examples of urban fighting, 
there are "remarkably few examples of the urban battlefield as a deliberate choice."16 
More often than not, urban fighting was inadvertent or unintentional due to 
miscalculations on the part of commanders. 17 
13 G. J. Ashworth, War and the Citv, (London, England: Routledge, 1991) p. 19 
14 Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1963) p. 78. 
15 Ashworth, War and the Citv, 3, 112. 
16 Ibid., p. 115. 
17 Ibid., p. 115. 
13 
The World War II experience provides the United States the legacy on which its 
current urban doctrine is based. The United States' own experience in the European 
theater in conducting military operations in towns and cities was substantial. But it was 
the Soviet-German experience in cities like Stalingrad and Warsaw that had an even 
greater impact. 
The dominant premise of Soviet urban doctrine, which evolved out of the World 
War II experience, is to avoid urban or built-up areas and to bypass if possible. If the city 
cannot be bypassed, then forward echelons should move in quickly to attack the city 
before strong defenses are emplaced. U.S. urban doctrine replicates the Soviet doctrine 
and has essentially remained unchanged during the 45 years of the Cold War. Even now, 
seven years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. urban doctrine remains the 
same. 
18 Author Andrew Krepinevich pointed out in The Army in Vietnam, that the 
United States Army as an organization did little to prepare for the type of conflict it 
would find itself in Vietnam. 19 Are we moving along that same path today by not 
preparing for future engagements in the urban environment in stability and support 
operations? 
The United States Army and the Marine Corps have a long history in "small" or 
unconventional wars dating from the American Revolution and the nineteenth century 
Indian Wars. Modem U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was developed largely from the 
18 For a more detailed description of Soviet urban doctrine, see John F. Meehan III, 
"Urban Combat: The Soviet View," Military Review 54, no. 9 (September 1974): 41-47.; 
and G. J. Ashworth, War and the Citv.. 122-3. 
19 Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986). 
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British experience in Malaya (1948-60) and the American experience in the Philippines 
(1946-54) against the Hukbalahaps. These insurgencies, as well as others in the 
twentieth century, are closely associated with communist revolutionary strategies, 
particularly those of Mao Tse-tung. Mao's revolutionary strategy emphasized creating 
insurgent bases in the countryside which would "ultimately surround the cities." Mao's 
success in China gave new impetus to other revolutions in Africa, Southeast Asia and 
Latin America where revolutionaries like Fidel Castro, Emesto "Che" Guevara, and 
Regis Debray preached that the fundamental discontent of the rural population would 
sustain the revolution. Because revolutionaries usually preferred to fight in the 
countryside, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was and continues to be designed to combat 
rural insurgencies. 
The Special Forces, created in 1952, revived the U.S. Army's unconventional 
warfare and counterinsurgency capability that had been abandoned after World War II. 
This revival was prompted by wars of national liberation, often communist directed 
which began to occur especially in the jungles of Latin and South America and Southeast 
Asia. Hence, Special Forces, operating almost exclusively in jungle environments came 
to regard themselves as "jungle warfare experts," a specialty reinforced during the 
Vietnam Era and one which defines the ARSOF "image" even today. 
A new millennium promises to bring a new battlefield in which the triple canopy 
jungles are replaced by the three dimensional city, jungle trails replaced by streets and 
alleys, the small rural village and hamlets by the sprawling megalopolis'. While the 
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ARSOF community must continue to prepare for combat in rural environments, we 
ignore the urban environment at our peril. 
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ll. WHY MORE URBAN OPERATIONS? 
Recent literature on the future of military urban operations resides almost 
exclusively on the premise that population growth and urbanization patterns by 
themselves explain why we are now more likely to fight in urban areas. That urban 
operations loom large in the future of U.S. forces seems certain. But to argue that the 
U.S. military will operate more and more in the urban environment simply because of 
demographic trends appears a trifle simplistic. Together with demographic trends, one 
must also consider socioeconomic conditions, the geopolitical environment, and the 
strategic, operational, and tactical factors to understand what makes urban areas a more 
likely combat zone, and why U.S. may be at a particular disadvantage against sub-state 
actors who chose to fight there. Socioeconomic trends suggest that increased numbers of 
people in Third World cities continues to strain a regime's ability to provide for the 
populace. Hence, the likelihood of social tension and political instability will increase. 
The geopolitical constraints imposed by the two superpowers has been lifted with the end 
of the Cold War. Religious, ethnic, and factional rivalries, once hidden in the shadow of 
the superpower rivalry, have already emerged to cause regional instability. There are 
also strategic, operational, and tactical reasons that a sub-state actor must consider during 
conflict, particularly with the threat of a possible intervention, from a power like the 
United States. An asymmetrical enemy will not only choose the "nature of the war," but 
also seek to fight on the terrain that he feels will give him the strategic, operational, and 
tactical advantage against more proficient U.S. forces. In today's world, the city 
environment may provide him with that advantage at all three levels of war. 
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A. DEMOGRAPIDC TRENDS 
Demographic trends offer the most visible evidence for the likely increase of 
urban operations. It is true that more people are occupying the cities in less-developed 
countries of the world through natural growth and by migration. But this, while 
important, is insufficient to explain why U.S. forces could, and should, anticipate more 
urban operations. 
1. Population Growth 
What is the city but the people? 
Shakespeare 
"The 1993 global population of 5.57 billion is projected to increase to 6.25 billion 
people in the year 2000, 8.5 billion in 2025 and 10 billion in 2050; significant growth 
will probably continue until about 2150 and a level off at about 11.6 billion."20 (See 
Table 2.1) This population growth is, and will continue to be, most pronounced in less 
developed areas of the world. 
Population (millions) 
1950 1970 1990 2000 2025 
World Total 2,516 3,698 5,292 6,261 8,504 
Industrialized 832 1,049 1,207 1,264 1,354 
Country_ (33.1) (28.4) (22.8) (20.2) (15.9) 
Developing Country 1,684 2,649 4,086 4,997 7,150 
(66.9) (71.6) (77.2) (79.8) (84.1) 
Table 2.1. Estimated and Projected Population 1950-2025 After Ref. [United Natwns 
Division, World Population Prospects 1990, United Nations, New York 1991]. 
20 The State of the World Population 1993, United Nations Population Fund (New York: 
United Nations, 1991) 1. 
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The timespan required for the world to add one billion people has shortened. The 
thirty-five years it once took to add one billion people has been reduced to twelve years 
between 1987 and 1999. Although population growth has failed to reach projections, 
population momentum21 will ensure high absolute increases for decades to come.22 It is 
projected that one billion people will be added to the world's population every twelve 
years until the year 2023. 
Less developed countries23 have accounted for the largest portion of population 
growth since the early 1950s and will continue to do so in the future. In the forty years 
between 1950 and 1990, developing countries increased their portion of population 
growth 16 percent to account for 93 percent of the world's population growth. It is 
expected that by the end of the century developing countries will account for 95 percent 
21 Population momentum is a term that demographers use to describe the phenomenon 
where absolute numbers of population increase remain high even after fertility rates have 
declined. Population momentum is usually a result of a youthful age structure found in 
the population of developing countries. 
22 Eduard Bos, My T. Vu, Ernest Massiah, and Rodolfo A Bulatao, World Population 
Projections 1994-95 Edition, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) 4. 
23 Less developed countries or regions as defined by the United Nations are comprised of 
Africa, Latin America, Asia (excluding Japan), and Melanesia, Micronesia, and 
Polynesia. The United Nations defines more-developed regions as Europe, North 
America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The United Nations General Assembly has 
a sub-category called least-developed countries which include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bennin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea, Buinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierre Leone, Solomon Islands, 
Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, 
Zaire, and Zambia. 
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of the world's population growth. The poorer the country, the faster the population 
grows. 
2. Urbanization Patterns 
This population growth is swelling the size of cities, as the world experiences 
rapid urbanization. According to the United Nation's World Urbanization Prospects 
1994, 45 percent of the world's population currently lives in urban areas. By the 
beginning of the 21st Century, over 50 percent of the world's population will live in an 
urban environment By the year 2025, an estimated three-fifths of the world population 







1994 2005 2025 
Table 2.2 Urban and Rural Population 
Percentage After Ref. [World Urbanization 
Prospects: 1994 Revision. United Nations]. 
Developing countries are steadily becoming more and more urbanized while in 
developed countries, urbanization figures have leveled off in recent years. The 
24 World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision, (New York: Population 
Information Network Gopher of the United Nations Population Division, 1995) 1. 
20 
proportion of the population of less-developed countries living in urban areas will reach 
61 percent by the end of the first quarter of the next century. Of course, the rate of 

























Table 2.3 Urban and Rural Population Percentage, 1994 and 2025 After Ref [World 
Population Prospects: 1994 Revision]. Prepared by the Population Division of the 
Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis (DESPIA). 
ARSOF have been, in different capacities, a part of past urban operations in some 
less-developed regions of Latin America and the Caribbean Region, the Middle East, 
Africa, and Asia. All of these areas supply operation rich environments for ARSOF, 
whether in past operations in such places like Panama City, Santo Domingo, Port au 
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Prince, Beirut, Mogadishu, and Liberia or in future operations as part of an intervening 
force or in a foreign internal defense (FID) mission advising government forces in such 
places as Mexico City, Karachi, Lima, Bogota, Manila, Calcutta, or Khartoum. 
B. SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS 
Socioeconomic factors also help to explain why the United States and ARSOF 
will increasingly operate in the urban areas of developing countries. Although the ideas 
of economist and demographic theorist Thomas Malthus have long linked population 
growth and conflict,25 there are other dynamics at work that suggest why the city will 
become more volatile with increased chances to be the focus of conflict. 
Cities have always had strategic importance in conflict and war: But as we enter 
into the next century, cities are more likely to become the center of gravity26 in less 
developed countries as they shift from rural to urban based economies. Where cities were 
once subservient to the countryside, in that they provided a market place and low-tech 
manufacturing for the dominant agricultural economy, cities are now the dominant 
feature in a developing country's economy. The rural sector's importance is in decline in 
its contribution to national economies. 27 As this happens, populations migrate to the 
cities. 
25 Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Demographic Component of Strategy," Survival, 31, no. 6 
(November/December, 1989) 550. 
26 Center of gravity is defined in FM 100-5 (1993) as " ... the hub of all power and 
movement upon which everything depends; that characteristic, capability, or location 
from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength or 
will to fight." 
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Because of this rural to urban shift in market economies, cities have increased in 
their "strategic importance ... because they are communication, economic and political 
centers ... they are also the political nerve centers. Greater urbanization will only increase 
the tendency for military forces to find themselves located in cities."28 Paul Bracken's 
assessment of NATO's urban trends in the mid-1970s is applicable to the current 
situation in countries of the less developed world. Where Mao once saw the conquest of 
the countryside as the key to the seizure of power, revolutions today are more likely to 
directly target the cities as the key center of gravity. 
Many developing country's cities are facing severe problems that will lead to 
political instability and disorder. Unemployment and underemployment exacerbates the 
extreme poverty which characterizes these Third World cities. As urban populations 
increase by both migration and natural population growth, labor demands become 
increasingly in short supply. Those who migrate to the city find that their expectations of 
improved living conditions remain unfulfilled. The populace that was raised in the city 
fmd it extremely difficult to compete for the scarce jobs.29 
Financial constraints along with the rapid population growth make it extremely 
difficult for regimes or national governments to provide the jobs, services, and security 
needed to help alleviate the problems linked to poverty, poor health, and limited 
27 The State of the World Population 1993, United Nations Population Fund (New York: 
1993)1. 
28 Paul Bracken, "Urban Sprawl and NATO Defense," Survival, 18, no. 6 
(November/December 1976): 254. 
29 A. S. Oberai, Population Growth. Employment and Povertv in Third-World Mega-
Cities: Analytical and Policy Issues, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 10-14. 
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education. The upkeep and improvement of urban infrastructure cannot keep pace with 
the population growth. Because of this, squatter settlements are rapidly encircling Third 
World cities, creating zones of social unrest and disorder. 
Political scientist Samuel Huntington argued, in the late sixties, that the empirical 
evidence did not support the premise that urban revolt and political disorder would be 
increased by new migrants to the city, who would become the slum dwellers. He does 
suggest that political and criminal urban violence " .. .is due to the rise as the proportion of 
natives to immigrants in the city rises. "30 It is the urban native who has lived under these 
squalid conditions for a prolonged period and who has no hope of improving them who is 
prone to political radicalism. Individuals who have lived in the city for long periods of 
time are more apt to rebel against authority.31 
C. GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Through all of its jive acts drama has run its course; the light of history is 
switched off, the world stage dims, the actors shrivel, the chorus sinks. 
The war of the giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have 
begun.32 
Winston Churchill 
The current geopolitical environment also explains why U.S. forces are likely be 
intervene in Third World urban environments. Most prominent among them is the 
decline of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The Cold War bipolar 
30 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1968) 283. 
31 Ibid., 282. 
32 Winston Churchill, The Aftermath, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929) 17. 
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world viewed conflicts in the Third World as merely an extension of the U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation. Both Washington and Moscow had an interest in preventing or controlling 
conflicts which might escalate. As United States Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC) intelligence analyst John Jandora states, "conflicts would be generated, 
enlarged, reduced, or extinguished largely in accordance with the policies and 
capabilities of the two superpowers."33 Additionally, the U.S. and Soviet disdain for 
urban operations, as mentioned earlier, frequently influenced how Third World conflict 
was to be fought. The tactics and training exported to Third World forces by both 
superpowers also mirrored their attitudes about fighting in the urban environment. 
The collapse of the former Soviet Union removed one element of restraint on the 
growth of conflict. In turn, the evolving U.S. National Strategy has expanded missions 
for the military, especially for ARSOF. The United States has moved from a Cold War 
strategy of containment, in which ARSOF focused primarily on direct action and 
strategic reconnaissance, to the new National Security Strategy of "engagement and 
enlargement. "34 This strategy is a direct result of the " ... radically transformed security 
environment facing the United States and our allies."35 
33 John Jandora, "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War," Parameters 25, no. 
1, (Spring 1995) 55-56. 
34 William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," 
The National Security Strategy, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1995). This 
strategy is " ... based on enlarging market democracies, while deterring and containing a 
range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests." The three central components 
of this strategy is a strong defense capability, opening foreign markets, and promoting 
democracy. 
35 Ibid., 2. 
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To support the National Security Strategy of "engagement and enlargement," the 
military has designed a strategy of flexible and selective engagement. This strategy 
includes nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, and 
peacekeeping under peacetime engagement. The second component of the military 
strategy is deterrence and conflict resolution which encompasses a host of activities to 
include crisis response, noncombatant evacuation operations and peace enforcement. 36 
A large number of these activities, now doctrinally called stability and support 
operations, fall somewhere between peacetime and conflict. ARSOF has played an 
integral part in providing the National Command Authority (NCA) with numerous 
options in this environment. As suggested, this is precisely the type of mission which 
will be more prevalent in the future. Operations like Panama City, Somalia, Haiti, 
Bosnia, and Liberia do not belong to the past. They point to the future of ARSOF 
missions. 
D. STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are a number of strategic, operational, and tactical reasons why sub-state 
actors would choose to fight in today' s urban environment. The enemy will choose the 
terrain that offers him a decided advantage and one in which can put a much larger, 
conventional ruling regime or intervening force at a disadvantage. On a strategic level, 
the political stakes are much higher in the city. Access to media coverage helps to 
36 John M. Shalikashvili, "A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement," The 
National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington D.C.: The 
Pentagon, 1995). The third component of the strategy is to fight and win. 
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promote the cause of the insurgent. 37 It can quickly create the impression of insurgent 
success, by visible and disruptive attacks against important political and communication 
targets. Either this will show the security forces to be weak and ineffective. Or, it can 
goad and provoke them into repression and overreaction which can demonstrate the 
abuses and repressive nature of the regime. This can immediately bring attention and 
scrutiny of the international community to bear on both the regime and sub-state actor. 
The resulting publicity for the incumbent power is likely to be unfavorable, while the 
revolution will gain international attention and hence leverage to advance their political 
goals. The aversion to casualties by the United States, particularly in stability and 
support operations, suggest that that sub-state actors would try to carry the conflict to the 
city in to more easily inflict casualties and attract media attention in order to influence 
U.S. domestic policy. The objective would be to cause a withdrawal of forces, as in 
Mogadishu, or to discourage U.S. intervention in the first place. It took eighteen dead 
soldiers in Mogadishu to completely reverse our foreign policy in Somalia. 
From an operational perspective, the creation of "sanctuary" in the squatter 
settlements, that surround Third World cities, places the insurgent in close proximity to 
political, economic, and cultural targets. Where the dense jungle or border areas once 
provided a safe haven for insurgents or guerrillas in this century, squatter settlements 
increasingly may serve this purpose in the next century. In many less-developed 
countries, police or security forces simply do not operate in these sections of cities, 
37 See Jennifer M. Taw and Bruce Hoffinan, The Urbanization of Insurgency: The 
Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations, MR-398-A (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994) 
12, for similar arguments. 
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leaving a virtual sanctuary within immediate striking distance to the capital and 
commercial areas. 
Anonymity is another operational advantage of insurgents for operating in urban 
areas. Swelling populations in urban areas added to a decreased presence of police and 
security forces allow for the sub-state actor to blend into the population even more 
effectively than in the countryside, where rural communities are close knit and an 
outsider is quickly identified. 
By operating in the city, the insurgent may be better able to shorten the length of 
the conflict. Mao's call for a strategy of"protracted struggle" in the countryside required 
more patience than many revolutionaries were prepared to endure. Today's insurgents 
may lack the patience for a protracted struggle. The city is a target which offers the 
benefits of rapid conquest of power. At the same time, insurgents may prepare a 
"fallback" plan and alternate between an urban and a rural dominant strategy in the event 
of a lengthy war. 
Insurgents or guerrillas are more likely to chose urban areas if they believe that 
they can use the urban environment to negate the operational and tactical strengths of a 
more technologically advanced army, such as that of the United States. The United 
States' aggressive forty-five year pursuit of a technologically superior army that could 
destroy another large conventional army finds limited application in the less developed 
world urban "conflict." In fact, our powerful conventional forces may be a disadvantage. 
Stability and support operations in an urban environment severely limits some of the 
major elements of U.S. combat power such as maneuver, firepower, and protection. FM 
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100-5 states that maneuver and firepower are inseparable. (Although one might think 
that this would only be considered in war, and not for stability and support operations, 
the link between maneuver, firepower, and protection becomes very important as the 
level of conflict intensifies, as was witnessed in Somalia). Our superior firepower is 
rendered less effective in an urban environment, if not counterproductive, during stability 
and support operations. The threat of collateral damage limits, even eliminates, the use 
of artillery, close air support, and naval gunfire. 38 Many of the standard weapons of the 
infantryman were not designed for urban fighting and are less effective in this 
environment. Not only are soldiers constrained by very restrictive rules of engagement 
(ROE) in stability and support operations, but ROEs become even more restrictive in an 
urban environment. 
Since firepower is negated, maneuver inherently becomes restricted. We are 
unable to offer the protection through firepower needed to move forces to a position of 
advantage around the city. For instance, in Mogadishu, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 
had an extremely difficult time trying to reach the Rangers by ground transport while 
helicopters providing air support unable to fire into the town for fear of causing civilian 
casualties, were brought down by small arms fire. 
Another element of combat power that is degraded in the urban environment is 
that of protection. There are four components of protection: operational security, health, 
safety, and the avoidance of fratricide. Operating in an urban environment means that 
one operates in one large danger area or choke point, normally avoided by soldiers in 
38 This point is also made in Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," p.47. 
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other combat environments. Because of the spatial differences, it is more difficult for 
ARSOF operators to infiltrate clandestinely and operate in the urban areas. In the urban 
environment, soldiers are under constant observation, particularly soldiers of a foreign 
force. Concealing movement becomes extremely difficult. 
Fratricide becomes an even larger issue in the urban environment because of the 
human spatial distance between friend and foe. If not already nullified by rules of 
engagement, any indirect fire mission would inherently be a "danger close" mission, 
threatening U.S. lives, creating our own casualties. There is also the problem of shooting 
through flimsy, poorly constructed shacks and buildings, as well as, ricocheting that 
causes fratricide or collateral damage. 
As one can see, there are more than just the simple demographic explanations that 
suggest that the urban environment will likely be the primary environment in which the 
United States Army is likely to operate during the next century. Socioeconomic trends, 
the geopolitical environment, and strategic, operational, and tactical considerations all 
sustain to the argument that the city is where conventional and ARSOF forces will find 
themselves predominantly operating. It will be of the utmost importance to have an 
updated, forward looking, and coherent doctrine that will guide the army and ARSOF in 
urban stability and support operations, as well as provide direction for training. 
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m. DOCTRINE AND TRAINING 
The US. Army's MOUT (FM 90-10, 1979) and Stability and Support Operations 
(FM 100-20, 1996 Draft) doctrine has developed over the years independently of one 
another. Current US. MOUT doctrine was deeply influenced by our World War II 
experiences and has continued to evolve over the years under a conventional, total war 
scenario. On the other hand, Stability and Support Operation's doctrinal lineage can be 
traced to the U.S. "small wars" experience of the United States in the Philippines and the 
British in Malaya. This doctrine was further refined during the Vietnam conflict. Since 
that time, "stability and support" operations have taken a backseat to Airland doctrine, as 
the military continued to focus on the potential for a conventional war with the Soviets. 
As Professor Steven Metz notes, " ... the importance of counterinsurgency in American 
national security strategy has ebbed and flowed. "39 However, with the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union, "stability and support" operations have received increased attention 
in the U.S. military. As previously stated, a premise of this thesis is that the US. Army 
and ARSOF will find itself operating increasingly in urban environments of less-
developed countries performing "stability and support" operations with inadequate 
doctrine. The lack of coordination between MOUT and Stability and Support Operations 
has brought the U.S. military to the doorstep of a new century with an inadequate and 
disjointed doctrine. The US. and ARSOF is doctrinally unprepared for "stability and 
39 Steven Metz, "A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold 
War," Parameters 25, no. 3, (Autumn, 1995) 31. Counterinsurgency operations fall under 
the Internal Defense and Development strategy in stability and support operations. 
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support" operations in the physical environment that will likely be predominant in the 
coming decades- that of the city. 
Field Manual (FM)100-5 Operations (1993), the army's keystone warfighting 
doctrine, states that "doctrine .. .is the authoritative guide to how Army forces fight wars 
and conduct operations other than war. ,,4o Closer scrutiny of the two manuals, FM 90-10 
and FM 100-5, will demonstrate the inadequacies of Army doctrine to operate in an 
urban environment. MOUT doctrine fails to address all states of the conflict, focusing 
only on conventional war, while Stability and Support Operations inadequately addresses 
the urban question. Stability and Support Operations manual theorizes more about 
conditions that lead to the conduct of these operations rather than address the conduct of 
the operations. 
A. URBAN DOCTRINE 
The Army's urban doctrine, FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urban Terrain, 
was published in 1979 at the height of the Cold War. Although it states in the preface 
that: 
... Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain include all [my italics] 
military actions that are planned and conducted on a terrain complex 
where manmade construction impacts on the tactical options available to 
the commander ... ,41 
40 Field Manuall00-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the 
Army, 1983) v. 
41 Field Manual90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, (Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters Department of the Army, 1979), i. 
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a survey of the manual indicates something quite different. The focus of FM 90-10 is 
clearly on conventional combat in total war and emphasizes the United States military's 
strengths of firepower and maneuver. To that extent, FM 90-10 is not relevant to all 
"military actions," particularly "stability and support" operations that are characterized 
by restraint and minimal force. In fact, one may even question the continued relevance 
ofFM 90-10 in contemporary conventional urban war given the changes in the world's 
security environment. 42 
This manual's shortcomings include the assumption that the enemy is a 
conventional force defending a city. As a result, the rules of engagement are those of the 
application of the full force of conventional weaponry. The effects of conventional 
military operations in an urban environment on the civilian population is barely 
discussed. Indeed, immense collateral damage is accepted as a given. Finally, with the 
exception of Civil Affairs, FM 90-10 contains no discussion of special operations. 
Needless to say, shortcomings of these dimensions mean that FM 90-10 is limited in its 
use in stability and support operations to conventional forces and ARSOF in its current 
form. 
The Army vision of the future battlefield will greatly impact how we plan, 
prepare, and train for war. The current FM 90-10 portrays an urban environment that 
42 Steven P. Goligowski, "Future Combat in Urban Terrain: Is FM 90-10 Still Relevant?" 
(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, 1995). 
This monograph provides an excellent examination of current MOUT doctrine and 
illustrates how MOUT doctrine is outdated and irrelevant given our changing threats. 
Many of the thoughts and ideas in the urban doctrine section of this thesis are addressed 
in Goligowski's work and the author acknowledges and gives credit to him. 
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does not replicate those characteristics found in many Third World cities. FM 90-10, 
" ... uses the central European setting to describe the[se] aspects of urbanization."43 A 
cursory examination of the pictures and. diagrams throughout the manual testifies to this 
fact. FM 90-10 boldly asserts that, " ... with minor modifications, it is applicable to other 
urban areas throughout the world. "44 The problem is that urban conditions found in 
Europe are quite different from many Third World countries. 
The threat, as described in FM 90-10 is a conventional army modeled on a Cold 
War Soviet order of battle (OB). This manual explains the tactics the enemy would 
employ in the conduct of conventional offensive and the defensive operations, from the 
motorized rifle division down to the motorized rifle battalion. Current MOUT doctrine 
excludes other types of threats that U.S. forces will likely face in future urban stability 
and support operations: insurgent or factional forces, terrorists, criminal organizations, 
regime forces, or an armed populace. 45 
Along with the lack of any significant discussion of civilians in the urban 
environment is the lack of discussion of collateral damage or ROE. Again, these aspects 
become very significant in stability and support operations in urban environments. FM 
90-10 talks of " ... concentrating overwhelming combat power ... shock, overwhelm and 
destroy the enemy ... and attacking the enemy from the rear ... .'.46 Again, concepts that 
43 Field Manual90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 1-2. 
44 Ibid., 1-2. 
45 See John Jandora's, "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War," for a 
detailed discussion of these threats. 
46 Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 2-10 and 2-11. 
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were applicable when speaking about conventional urban operations in World War II, are 
utterly disastrous if used today in current stability and support operations. What is more 
difficult to do, and what should be addressed in doctrinal manuals, is the conduct of 
military operations under restrictive ROE and with the intent to do as little collateral 
damage as possible. 
FM 90-10 fails to examine in-depth one of the most important considerations in 
any type of urban operations, but especially stability and support operations--the 
population. Civilians are seen, at best as a nuisance; and at worst, an impediment to 
effective operations. "The presence of a large concentration of civilians confined within 
a comparatively small area can inhibit significantly inhibit tactical operations," states FM 
90-10.47 Chapter V describes civilians either as refugees, exiting the city in droves, or 
staying within the city, cowering in comers of buildings until the operations are over. 
Both depictions bear little resemblance to reality. One only had to participate in a U.S. 
operation like Panama City, Mogadishu, or Port au Prince, or watch televised broadcasts 
from Sarajevo, Grozny, or Monrovia to understand that the population does not always 
intend to leave or hide away--they may continue to go to and from work, sell goods in the 
street, and carry on with day-to-day life. FM 90-10 trivializes the population, factors 
them out of the operational equation, when in fact, as far as ARSOF is concerned, could 
be the most important part of the equation. 
47 Field Manual90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 5-5. 
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The final glaring shortcoming of FM 90-10 is the complete neglect of ARSOF. 48 
With no discussion of ARSOF in the urban doctrine, a valuable asset is left unaddressed 
to conventional commanders. This force is not discussed at all. The only mention of any 
ARSOF element is Civil Affairs. There is no discussion of Special Forces or 
Psychological Operations. Again, this dates back to World War II, when there were only 
ad hoc ARSOF units and ideas of "winning hearts and minds" was just a glimmer in 
Edward Lansdale's eyes 
These urban doctrinal inadequacies reflect combat fifty years ago, but does little 
to prepare us for the future, much less guide us in the problems of today. As Major 
Steven Goligowski points out in his School of Advanced Military Studies thesis, "the 
goal of the army must be a viable doctrine with sufficient adaptability to meet the diverse 
conditions of the post-Cold War.'A9 This capstone doctrinal manual does not do this. 
B. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE 
Stability and Support Operations, FM 100-20 (Draft 1996), is the capstone 
doctrine that amplifies Chapter XIII of FM 100-5 entitled Operations Other Than War. 
The manual is designed to be " ... conceptual...and broad ... and is the foundation on which 
other combined arms and branch doctrine and TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures] 
should be based."50 FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations replaces FM 100-20 
48 It should be noted that at the time of publication for FM 90-10 (1979), SF was not a 
combat arms branch of the army. At that time, SF was considered a functional area. 
49 Steven Goligowski, "Future Combat in Urban Terrain: Is FM 90-10 Still Relevent?" 1. 
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(1993) Operations Other Than War. FM 100-20 (Draft 1996) is a virtually unchanged 
version of its predecessor with the exception of its title. It discusses the same aspects and 
describes the same missions as the 1993 version: counterinsurgency, support for 
insurgency, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations. FM 100-20 provides a better 
theoretical framework and updates the current world security environment. However, its 
treatment of urban operations remains inadequate. 
Appendix E, "Executing the IDAD Strategy," describes "special" environments in 
which stability and support operations take place as either remote, border, or urban areas. 
These "broad and conceptual" qualities are certainly applicable to urban operations. It 
acknowledges that "an urban environment requires different emphasis and techniques 
than those in rural areas. "51 The gap between the two doctrinal manuals is clearly 
established when FM 100-20 states that "operations in urban areas are executed in 
accordance with MOUT doctrine."52 As established earlier, FM 90-10 addresses 
conventional combat operations in war and not on stability and support operations in 
conflict and peacetime. FM 100-20 again addresses the urban environment in Chapter 
VI, "Foreign Internal Conflict." This chapter discusses the urban versus rural aspects of 
5° Field Manual 100-20, Stabi1itv and Suooort Ooerations, (Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters Department of the Army, 1996 Draft) 1. 
51 Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Supoort Operations, 153. 
52 Ibid., 154. 
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a strategy and offers reasons why insurgents would want to choose the city, but does not 
address "how" one might conduct such operations. 53 
Despite a long history of "stability and support" operations, the U.S. Army has 
never readily accepted low-intensity conflict as anything other than a distraction from its 
primary mission of conventional war. As RAND researchers Jennifer Morrison Taw and 
Robert Leicht write, " ... [the] doctrinal treatment of operations in that environment [low 
intensity conflict] in the latter half of this century has been sporadic and its acceptance by 
the post-WW II Army has been luk:ewarm."54 By continuing to treat urban operations in 
"stability and support" operations doctrine as if it were part of conventional war, military 
commanders and planners are left rudderless when they approach future urban stability 
and support operations. This is not to suggest that we should be compelled to create a 
rigid doctrinal manual that does not offer flexibility. There should be a base document 
which can be applied to many situations and provides for doctrinal flexibility. 
ARSOF is affected both directly and indirectly by these doctrinal shortcomings. 
First, ARSOF is directly affected because the doctrine is either completely lacking (FM 
90-10) or vague (FM 100-20) in its treatment of how to get the maximum utilization of 
ARSOF in this unique and complex environment. By not having a clear understanding of 
53 Robert A Rosenwald, "A venues Embattled: Urban Operations in Low Intensity 
Conflict," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, USCGSC, 
1990) 6. This thesis addresses the weakness of low-intensity conflict (LIC) doctrine as 
applied to the urban environment. 
54 Jennifer Morrison Taw and Robert C. Leicht, The New World Order and Army 
Doctrine: The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War?, R-4201-A (Santa 
Monica: RAND 1992) 11. See this work for a complete discussion on historical 
evolution "operations short of war" doctrine. The authors also discuss the army's 
resistance to these types of operations. 
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the capabilities, roles, and missions, a valuable strategic asset and force multiplier is 
likely to be omitted or misused. 
The lack of any coherent urban and stability and support doctrine also affects 
ARSOF indirectly. One of Special Forces' primary missions is foreign internal defense 
(FID). In their advisory capacity, SF is called upon " ... to train, advise, and otherwise 
assist host nation military and paramilitary forces with the goal of host nation being able, 
unilaterally, to assume responsibility to eliminate internal instability."55 When SF trains 
and advises foreign forces, it bases its methods on U.S. doctrine. As many of these host 
nation governments ask for U.S. assistance in addressing this emerging urban problem, 
SF will be tasked to assist these countries and to export U.S. doctrine to adapt and fit 
each country's case. Without a doctrinal base from which to develop training, SF is left 
with little guidance other than its own initiative, any personal experiences, and what little 
training it may have received in these types of operations. 
C. TRAINING 
Training is the vehicle through which soldiers prepare for future combat. 
Training must be realistic, challenging, and reflect the environment in which soldiers will 
be fighting. There are two aspects of training when considering urban operations: 
quantity and the quality. Many have argued that these are so closely intertwined that they 
are impossible to separate. Unfortunately, our training falls short in both categories. 
55 Joint Pub 3.05, Doctrine for Joint Soecial Ooerations (Draft) 28. 
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Based on informal interviews of group and battalion commanders and operations 
officers, the general consensus is that ARSOF is inadequately trained in urban operations. 
All cite lack of doctrine and lack of realistic training areas and facilities as contributing 
factors. Special Operations Training (SOT) teams practice on individual and small unit 
collective skills in room clearing and close quarters combat. This training in effective, 
discriminate shooting skills is essential to urban operations, particularly in stability and 
support operations in the urban environment. But it is not enough. More than 
discriminate shooting or room clearing skills are needed. 
1. Leader Training 
The Special Forces Officer's Qualification Course (SFOQC) is the course 
designed to prepare future Special Forces officers for future assignments. The emphasis 
of this course is on mission planning. Officers conduct planning exercises in each of the 
primary missions. All of these missions focus operations in the rural environment. 
These exercises are planned in the jungles, or rural areas of Latin America. The 
culminating exercise for officers and NCOs is "Robin Sage." This event is an 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) exercise in a rural environment. This is not to suggest 
that the such an exercise is unnecessary, but that it offers yet another illustration of the 
disproportionate amount of emphasis placed on planning and executing operations in a 
rural environment. ARSOF's own FM 100-25 states that, " ... because of increasing global 
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urbanization, SOF must now address all [my emphasis] aspects of clandestine 
resistance. "56 
Quantity of training may be a direct reflection of the amount of quality training. 
Ralph Peters argues that the training facilities currently in the army inventory do not train 
soldiers in city fighting, but in small town or village fighting. 57 Others have argued the 
point that operating in an urban environment is squad and platoon size elements doing 
nothing more than room and building clearing, thereby making these MOUT villages 
adequate. 58 Both are right to a certain degree. Current MOUT facilities for the most part 
are what we would classify as a village or hamlet. Also, operations in an urban 
environment is very decentralized and focused at the squad and platoon level. The point 
that is being missed is that the most difficult aspect of Third World urban areas to 
replicate is the mass of people or the concrete jungle. We have failed to reproduce 
anything in training that comes close to the people looking like a Mogadishu or Port au 
Prince. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This inadequacy in doctrine and the division between urban and stability 
operations has potentially serious consequences. Operations conducted in peacetime and 
conflict in this environment, that is not based on doctrine, will mean that the military 
56 FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, 3-6. 
57 Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996) 50. 
58 See Sean Naylor's, "The Urban Warfare Challenge," for the argument by LTC Steve 
Scholtz, from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, that U.S. MOUT training facilities 
are adequate. 
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must to plan operations in a doctrinal vacuum. This is dangerous when tactical actions 
may actually undermine strategic objectives, as they did in Somalia. It is at the 
operational level that provides the vital link between strategic objectives and tactical 
employment of forces. 
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IV. THE FRENCH IN ALGIERS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Algerian war erupted in 1954 and terminated with the Evian Accords of 
1962. France first became involved in Algeria in the 1830's when a military expedition 
of35,000 troops landed on the shores ofNorth Africa and captured the city of Algiers. 59 
After fifteen years of brutal military operations, Abd-el-Kader surrendered in 1847 to 
Marshall Thomas Bugeaud. The declaration "of Algeria as an integral part of France" in 
1848 would mark the beginning of a long resentment of the tribes toward the French. 60 
The same city that provided the French with its first military victory on the North African 
coast would again give the French another tactical victory 125 years later--but with 
disastrous strategic and political consequences. 
On November 1, 1954, a mere handful of Algerian rebels simultaneously attacked 
and detonated a series of bombs which announced that, for the Front de Liberation 
Nationale (FLN), Algeria was a French colony yearning for independence. French 
forces, sent to quell the uprising, were forced to improvise operations in a situation which 
had been given almost no forethought. The French paras, 61 many of them already 
veterans of the Indochina war, initially discovered that they were in their element in the 
Algerian bled, as the hinterland was known. But the very success of the paras in the field 
caused their opponents to alter their strategy. During the Soumamm Conference of 1956, 
59 Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1961 ), 17. 
60 Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 30. 
61 Paras is a French expression used to identify soldiers in airborne units. 
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the FLN opted to carry the conflict to an environment unfamiliar to the seasoned paras-
the city streets of Algiers. 
The principal area of operations was a section of Algiers known as the Casbah-a 
city within a city that is characteristic of many urban areas in today' s less developed 
countries, " ... a teaming labyrinth of torturous alleys, stairways and cui-de-sacs that 
smelled of dung and urine, which outsiders found both disorienting and intimidating. "62 
B. THE INSURGENCY 
1. History 
In May of 1945, a group of Muslims interrupted V-E day celebrations with attacks 
on the European town of Setif in Eastern Algeria. French forces launched brutal 
retaliatory strikes on the villages of the Constantinois. The uprising was put down at the 
cost of around I 000 Muslim lives. 63 Although the Setif uprising was suppressed, an ever 
expanding economic rift between the European ''pied noir" and the Muslim community 
after World War II aggravated tensions in Algeria. The new wave of Algerian 
nationalists, many of whom were veterans of French colonial forces, traced their 
inspiration to May, 1945. 
The FLN was born out of the merger of the Comite Revolutionnaire d'Unite 
d'Action (CRUA) and the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques 
62 Douglas Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary 
Fighting Force, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) 580. 
63 Behr, The Algerian Problem, 54. Estimates say that approximately a thousand 
Muslims died. 
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(MTLD). Like the MTLD, the FLN's goal was full independence for Algeria from 
France. Unlike the MLTD, however, the FLN resolved to achieve this by violent means. 
The FLN was the political arm of the revolution whose strength was somewhere between 
two and three thousand members in 1954. Of that, two or three hundred were members 
of the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN), the military arm of the FLN. By 1956, 
their numbers increased dramatically with over eight thousand armed guerrillas and close 
to twenty one thousand in the supporting underground. 
2. Ideology and Goals 
The FLN' s ideology and goals were simple, straightforward, and easily summed 
up in one word: nationalism. Algerian nationalism began to rise in the vacuum left by 
the defeat of France in 1940. Muslims wanted an increased voice in the governance of 
Algeria, which administratively considered an integral part of France. The FLN, however 
sought complete independence of Algeria. Their proclamation of October 31, 1954, 
called for independence of Algeria through ''the restoration of sovereign, democratic, and 
social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles ... [and] respect of the 
basic liberties without distinction as to race or religion."
64 The inability of the French 
government to devolve power to Muslim Algerians encouraged radical elements to resort 
to violent methods. 65 
64 John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, 
(Bloomington, IL: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992) 159. 
65 Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation, (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963) 25. 
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3. Strategy 
The FLN combined a political, diplomatic, and military strategy designed to 
protract the conflict in an attempt to force the French government to abandon Algeria. 
The FLN' s strategy not only sought to take advantage of discrimination against Algerian 
Muslims but also understood the importance of influencing external conditions as well. 
The internationalization of their struggle would bring the Algerian situation to the notice 
of the rest of the world. By internationalizing the problem, the Algerian Muslims hoped 
to gain support from a sympathetic Islamic world, especially of Egypt. 
Between 1954 and 1956, the FLN followed a rural guerrilla warfare strategy 
which sought to build up bases in the countryside. Activities by the FLN resulted in 
overreaction by the French forces. It was at the Soummam Conference of 1956 when the 
internal FLN leadership decided to implement an urban strategy. The absence of the 
external leadership from the conference resulted in the primacy of the internal 
leadership. 66 The internal leadership decided to transfer the main focus of the struggle to 
Algiers. What influenced the rebel leadership to move the emphasis of the insurgency 
from the rural areas to the urban environment? There are conflicting arguments as to 
why this happened. 
Some argue that the rural insurgency was failing. By the fall of 1956, the French 
had stifled much of the initiative of the insurgency in the countryside, which increased 
terrorist activities in the city and provided relief for the ALN and their operations in the 
66 The internal leadership directed operations within Algeria, while the external 
leadership directed operations outside of Algeria. The external leadership organized 
logistical support, as well as, ensuring that internal operations maintained the support of 
the Muslim world. 
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countryside. Political scientist Martha Crenshaw counters that although it is true that the 
French had taken some of the initiative from the rural insurgency, the FLN leadership 
saw victory as imminent. Urban terrorism, they calculated, would mobilize the 
population of Algiers and supply the final impetus to victory. 67 
4. Tactics 
Throughout the conflict, the FLN used guerrilla tactics to achieve their strategic 
goals. The FLN used a decentralized command structure. They divided areas up into 
provinces called wilayas, each with its own commander. Commanders controlled the 
insurgent activities such as terror, assassination, and sabotage. As they changed from a 
rural to an urban strategy, the FLN began emphasizing urban terrorism as a means to 
achieve their goals. Bombings in public places in Algiers would surely bring the desired 
international attention, as well as spark further excessive and repressive measures by the 
French, further polarizing and alienating the population. 
Terrorism is used to discredit the incumbent while at the same time 
demonstrating the strength of the insurgents. Terrorism in Algiers was used with many 
target audiences in mind. First, terrorism was used to bring fear to European population 
in Algiers, to reinforce the notion that the French government could not protect them. 
Terrorism would be used to show the Algerian population that there was a strong 
organization that would protect their interests. The world community was another target 
67 Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, 488. 
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audience. Terrorist acts in public places in Algiers was designed to attract the 
international community to their cause. 
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
No sooner had the French Army closed the chapter on its involvement in the First 
Indochina War, when trouble erupted in North Africa, demanding the military's attention 
in the French colonial possession of Algeria. The military was not completely 
disengaged from Indochina, as some " ... 80,000 troops remained in Indochina as 
permitted under the Geneva Agreement. "68 France began to shift its efforts to a crisis 
much closer to its own shores. The May 1955 agreement which pulled the last French 
troops out of Indochina now allowed for the French military to refocus on Algeria. At the 
beginning of the insurgency in 1955, there were approximately 55,000 troops stationed in 
Algeria. By 1956, those numbers increased to 200,000 and by August of the same year, 
400,000 troops had deployed to Algeria. At one point, three-fifths of French Army was 
committed in Algiers. 69 
1. Forces Available 
The French Army in Algeria was organized as they had normally been in peace-
time. The 1Oth Military District was divided into three corps sectors with the corps 
68 Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the Drevfus Affair to the Gulf War, 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 354. 
69 Ibid., 176 
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headquarters at Oran, Algiers and Constantine. The corps areas were subdivided in 
zones, sectors, and sub-sectors. 70 The boundaries of the military zones did not 
correspond to those of the Algerian civil administration. This would eventually lead to 
conflicts of overlapping authority . 
Below division level, tables of organization and equipment were altered to meet 
the Algerian contingency. Formations of new units were developed to fight this irregular 
form of warfare. Most of the changes resulted to meet the needs of conducting 
counterinsurgency operations in the rural areas. Some changes did carry over when the 
French started urban operations. 71 
The Reserve Generate was a collection of units made up of paratroops, Foreign 
Legion and Marine commandos based in Algiers. These units deployed to the rural parts 
of Algiers only to reinforce regular troops for bouclage operations. 72 The paras and the 
Legion performed the direct action strike mission while the rest of the Army, composed 
of French conscripts, concentrated on pacification and static garrison duty. There were 
20,000 French Foreign Legion stationed in Algeria. The elite green beret Paras of the 1st 
R.E.P. were stationed west of Algiers.73 
70 George Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MI.T. Press, 1965) 175. 
71 Ibid., 182. 
72 Ibid., 178. Bouclage was a counterguerrilla technique where one unit would seal off 
an area and act as a blocking force, while a mobile force would drive the guerrillas to 
them. 
73 Home, A Savage War of Peace, 169. 
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2. Battle of Algiers 
The "Battle of Algiers" began in January, 1957 when General Massu of the lOth 
Parachute Division was given military control of Algiers by Robert Lacoste, the Resident 
Minister of Algiers. The lOth Paras maintained operational control of the city until 
September 1957. This nine month battle pitted the lOth Parachute Division against the 
FLN underground, the Zone Autonome d'Alger (ZAA). 
The origins of the "Battle of Algiers" can be traced to the fall of 1956 when a 
combination of violent acts against the Muslim population by French extremists, 
extremists blew up a house in the Casbah, causing one hundred Muslim deaths 
74 
and the 
public execution of Algerian nationalist prisoners by the government, which set off a 
series of brutal and indiscriminate killings by the FLN. 
The FLN decided it was time to bring more international attention to their cause. 
They believed that by moving the emphasis of insurgency to the capital city, the 
increased press coverage would justify their quest for independence within the 
international community. The timing of the move coincided with a meeting of the U.N. 
General Assembly. A national strike on January 28, 1957 was to last eight days to 
publicize their cause to the world and the UN. The strike was to take place in the capital 
city-Algiers. As British historian G.J. Ashworth notes, "capital cities are the self 
conscious show-cases of the country and thus of the governing regime. The city presents 
74 Martha Crenshaw, "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in Martha 
Crenshaw, eds., Terrorism in Context, (University Park, Penna.: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1995), 485. 
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a range of targets not only by their physical density but also by their practical and 
symbolic importance." 75 
From 1954 on, the French did not fight a war, but became engaged in a police 
. th "fi . 76 operation, en pac1 1cat10n. The Governor General of Algeria was in overall 
responsibility for the security of Algeria. The national police had total responsibility of 
the security in major urban areas to include the city of Algiers. From 1954 until January 
1957, random violence and terrorism continued to rise. The police became less and less 
effective, not only in the eyes of the population but more importantly to the government. 
The massive wave of violence in Algiers in the fall of 1956 saw the end of police 
primacy in security operations in Algiers. Robert Lacoste ordered the 1Oth Parachute 
Division into Algiers under Authority of the Special Powers Law. The lOth Paras' 
mission was " ... the re-establishment of order, the protection of persons and property and 
the safeguard of the territory."77 
Up until this time, the military had control of the rural area in the southern sector 
of Algeria while the northern sector was under the urban police civil administration. 
This proved to have some significant consequences for the military in terms of 
intelligence gathering. By this time the FLN had become well entrenched in the Casbah, 
75 Ashworth, War in the City, 88. 
76 Trinquier, Modem Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 93. 
77 
"Programm et action du gouverement en Algerie; mesures de pacification et 
reformes," (Algiers, 1956) cited in Talbott, The War Without A Name: France in Algeria, 
1954-1962,79. 
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and the delayed employment of the military meant that they had no established contacts 
with the civilians. 78 
It did not take long for General Massu and the lOth Paras to transition from the 
rural to the urban environment. Operations in Algiers were swift and ruthless from the 
start. Strikebreaking became their first test. On evening of the 27th, shops closed, 
students stayed away from schools, and government workers failed to report for work. 
Massu began his strikebreaking operation along with a PSYOP campaign. He used 
helicopters to drop leaflets while loudspeakers appealed to Muslims to return to work. 
After only one day, Massu employed harsher tactics. The paras used armored cars to 
tear the steel shutters from shop fronts. To secure their goods against looting, shop 
owners had to stay in their stores. On the 28th, the paras provided a "collection service" 
rounding up truant kids in trucks and taking them back to school. 79 The strike had been 
broken in forty-eight hours. But, as British historian Alistair Home points out, "the main 
benefit for the FLN, was to be derived, unexpectedly and indirectly, rather from the 
methods used in breaking the strike than from anything achieved by it. "80 
Although the lOth Paras achieved what they perceived as an initial tactical 
victory, the urban environment would quickly begin to take its toll on the soldier. 
78 Trinquier, Modem Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency.. 93. 
79 Home, A Savage War ofPeace, 191. 
80 Ibid,. 192. 
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Colonel Roger Trinquier aptly characterized the effects which the urban environment had 
on French soldiers: 
Patrolling the Casbah's narrow streets, the paratroopers could not 
distinguish a member of the terrorist network from a harmless old lady, a 
shoeshine boy from an FLN courier. They found themselves in the 
position of the Germans in occupied France, the British in colonial 
Boston, the French in the Vendee, the Americans in Saigon. The virtual 
sanctuary offered by the Casbah, the silence of the Muslim population, the 
elaborate structure of the terrorist network-withal, the paratroopers had 
scarcely the slightest idea for whom they were looking. 
The paratroops liked to contrast the purity of fighting in the countryside 
with the disagreeableness of their work in the city. The desert chase, the 
mountain hunt conformed to their idea of the soldier's vocation. Combing 
a city for persons unknown, they complained, was un boulot de flic, a 
cop's job. 81 
Another example of the frustrations felt by the soldiers during urban operations is seen 
where a soldier noted in his journal: 
... as the war went on, what became almost worse than hatred was the 
indifference that grew in the army towards the hunting-down and killing 
of fellaghas; it was an indifference experienced by troops of many another 
nation in similar situations, that also spread to embrace the all-too-
frequent cases where innocent civilians were shot down in error by 
frightened, angry or trigger-happy soldiers.82 
Quadrillage, a tactical concept that proved successful in the rural areas and was utilized 
in Algiers by the lOth Paras. 83 The French adapted quadrillage for use in urban areas. 
81 
"Une Note du colonel Trinquier et du R.P. Delarue," in Vidal-Naquet, Raison d'etat, 
118, cited in John Talbott, The War Without A Name: France in Algeria. 1954-1962, 85. 
82 Home, A Savage War of Peace, 173. 
83 Quadrillage is that the country is gridded into small units or districts with French 
garrisons put up to protect the populace. Out of the quadrillage concept developed the 
regroupment policy which moved the local population into villages near the garrisons for 
protection. 
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The city of Algiers was divided into four sections with each section under the command 
of a regiment of the 1Oth Para Division. Each area was cordoned off with checkpoints 
controlling the movement in and out of the Casbah. The 3rd R.P.C. under Col. Bigeard,. 
had control of the Muslim dominated Casbah. 
Border operations were a very effective measure in the counterinsurgency 
program that had a large impact once the FLN began their campaign in Algiers. The 
French had cut off most support to the ALN through the Morice Line ran which along the 
Algerian!funisian border. This barrier consisted of electric fence, mine fields, radar and 
block houses, recon planes, flood lights, and mechanized patrols. This was very effective 
in disrupting command and supply problems for the insurgents from external support and 
cut off any sanctuary they once enjoyed. Due to lack of weapons, the ALN resorted to 
homemade bombs. 
Psychological operations became one of the key elements m the 
counterinsurgency effort of the French in Algeria. In March of 1955, the lOth Military 
District created the bureaux psychologiques. This agency was created to use on 
indigenous and for counter propaganda with their own soldiers. 84 
It wa.S not until July of 1956 that France created four Loudspeaker and Leaflet 
Companies and the cinquiemes bureaux, three of which went to the 1Oth Military 
District. These loudspeaker units were used almost exclusively in the countryside. The 
latter provided staff officers trained in psychological operations to major Army 
commands. Officers of the cinquiemes bureaux did not arrive in Algeria until November 
84 Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962, 184. 
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1957. They were assigned to each of the corps headquarters in Oran, Algiers, and 
Constantine as well as headquarters in all operational zones and sectors. Officers of the 
cinquiemes bureaux who were not attached to organic units were used to conduct 
psychological operations in urban areas. 85 
Psychological operations as an integral part of the military effort was a fairly new 
concept for the French. Only after the Battle of Algiers did officers arrive in country to 
coordinate the psychological effort. To decide whether psychological operations would 
have influenced the tactical outcome of the battle is mute since the French opted for 
force over persuasion in the "Battle of Algiers." But psychological operations might 
have been effective on the population or altered the commander's approach to tactical 
operations. 
3. New Tactics and Organization 
The French developed new organizations to help the counterinsurgent effort. The 
Dispositif de Protection Urbaine (D.P.U.) was developed by Colonel Roger Trinquier, 
one of France's most famous practitioners of counterinsurgency warfare. Colonel 
Trinquier divided the city into sectors, sub-sectors, and blocks. He then recruited a 
Muslim who lived in the area and gave him responsibility to monitor and report all 
suspicious activities. This organization produced great results and allowed access and 
close ties to the urban Muslim community. This proved to be one of the a greatest threats 
to the FLN. This organization had its downside also. These Muslim "wardens" were 
threatened by the FLN on the one hand and by the French on the other. 
85 Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962, 184-186. 
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Intelligence collection was one of biggest efforts for the French in Algiers. 
Intelligence organizations were not large enough to do all that was required and quickly 
became overtaxed. They realized that operations would be ineffective without current 
intelligence. The French responded with a nwnber of ad hoc organizations and tactical 
responses to aid in their collection effort. The Docwnentation and Counterespionage 
Service (SDECE), a French intelligence organization, created a "special operations" 
group called the "11th Shock." This organization worked extensively with the paras in 
Algiers, specializing in intelligence-connected clandestine military operations. It was the 
"11th Shock" that confiscated the police files and dossiers prior to the asswnption of 
control of Algiers by the lOth Paras. Another organization developed out of this was 
called the bleus. The bleus were former FLN members now serving as double agents. 86 
Torture became a controversial technique in as a collection method. The use of 
torture was not new to the French military, but it has been said that it became 
institutionalized during the "Battle of Algiers." The paradoxical success of this 
technique has been widely debated. There is no question to impact that this technique 
had on the success of the tactical operations in Algiers. The paras effectively quelled the 
insurgency in Algiers in less than nine months. What the paras failed to understand was 
the political impact this ad hoc solution would have on, not only the Algerian population, 
but the French domestic political situation. 
86 RD. McLaurin and R. Miller, "Urban Counterinsurgency: Case Studies and 
Implications for U. S. Military Forces," (Springfield, VA: Hwnan Engineering 
Laboratory, 1990) 114. 
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.-----------------------------------------
The Section Administrative Urbaines (SAU) was developed in 1957 during the 
Battle of Algiers. The SAU was patterned after the Section Administrative Speciale 
(SAS).87 Whereas the SAS operated in the countryside, the SAU was designed 
specifically for the urban environment. The SA Us spent less time on education and food 
distribution than the SAS, and focused more on control, protection, and 
counterpropaganda. 88 The SAU served as the link between civil servants and military 
and intermediary between military and locals. They spent most of their time working 
largely in the slums (bidonvilles) to improve social services and mobilize the population. 
The French Army recruited for the SAS and SAU with the highest standards in personal 
and professional attributes in mind. The high standards limited selection. There were 
never enough personnel to do a complete and thorough job. "That many of their duties 
lay in building, teaching, and healing appealed to the idealistic and the unconventional 
soldier. A military elite was fostered in the Sections, whose members envinced an 
exceptionally intense personal involvement in their work. "89 This was quite different 
from how the rest of the army was looked upon for the methods they used in the conduct 
of operations. The SAU worked with the civil administration to find work and housing in 
the slums, build up social services, mobilize the population to provide intelligence 
against insurgent terrorists. SAU' s emphasis was on social reform at the community 
87 The Section Administrative Speciale (SAS) formed in September of 1955. These units 
were three to five man teams whose primary charter was to "to reestablish contact with 
the population." and to oversee local government and programs to assist in giving 
Algerians more local autonomy. 
88 Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962, 182. 
89 Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a 
Political and Military Doctrine, 50. 
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level and control of the populace. 90 This organization worked extremely well at first 
while under control of the Minister of the Interior. After 1958, these organizations lost 
much of there effectiveness once they fell under control of the army. The army used 
these organizations as a dumping ground for undesirable officers. 
4. Doctrine 
The French Army had very little time to digest the experience of the First 
Indochinese War before they were plunged in the Algerian conflict, one which the 
officers who had served in Indochina were determined to win. 91 Colonel Charles 
Lacheroy, a veteran of Indochina, developed a doctrine that became known as !a querre 
revolutionnaire, a counterrevolutionary doctrine based on Mao's and Giap's version of 
revolutionary doctrine,92 which the latter believed allowed a conventionally inferior 
force to defeat a modern, well trained army. 
The doctrine of !a guerre revolutionnaire focused on two areas of revolutionary 
conflict First, it looked at the nature of the conflict to discern what is uniquely 
characteristic of the conflict, and what tactics are being used by the insurgents. It should 
be noted that the French were perceptive enough to re-evaluate the doctrine as the 
90 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Internal Defense Operations: A 
Case History, Algeria 1954-62," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: CGSC Press, 1966), 51-55 
cited in Shea, French Military Thought 1946-1966,241. 
91 Anthony J. Joes, From the Barrel of a Gun: Armies and Revolutions, (Washington: 
Pergamon-Brassey, 1986) 140. 
92 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1975) 912. 
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Algerian conflict evolved. The early doctrine focused mainly on military reaction to the 
insurgency. Lacheroy began to look further into the psychological aspects of warfare and 
how the loyalty of the population could be maintained by the government. Many officers 
who served in the Indochinese conflict perceived Algerian conflict by its true nature. 
They understood that the FLN' s goal was to win the support of the population before it 
would gain any territory. Many of them read the French colonial strategist, Lyautey, who 
emphasized pacification programs and tied together military, administrative and 
psychological functions. 93 
La gue"e revo/utionnaire is the doctrinal framework which would serve as the 
guide for the French in the Algerian war. 94 It was an attempt to break from the shackles 
of conventional thought and put forth a cogent doctrine to counter the insurgent threat. 
LaGuerre revolutionnaire was "doctrine," but not how we might envision it today--that 
is, a guide to operations. It was really more of a vision of insurgency and sought as much 
understand the nature of revolution, as well as applying principles and techniques against 
it. One downfall of Ia gue"e revolutionnaire was that it understood insurgency as part of 
an international communist conspiracy. With their recent experience in Indochina, many 
officers studied the teachings of Mao, hence their lack of forethought on the urban area 
as a medium to conduct war. 
93 Alf A.Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, (Bloomington, Ind: 
Indiana University Press, 1972) 92. 
94 Paret, French Revolutionarv Warfare From Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a 
Political and Military Doctrine 5. 
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5. Training 
If armies exist to deter war, or in case of deterrence failure, to win in combat, 
then training is the vehicle by which this is done. Training, from the individual soldiers 
to senior leaders should be focused on meeting the most probable scenario for the next 
conflict. The French were unprepared for the type of conflict they would encounter in 
Algeria in 1954, but took steps to adapt their training and education to meet the new 
situation. 
In Algeria there were two distinct armies within the French force--one made up of 
elite professional forces and a second composed largely of short-service French 
conscripts. The former a highly seasoned army with extensive combat experience, and 
the latter a poorly trained army of conscripts. But both professional and conscript alike 
were unprepared for the conditions they would encounter. It was the professional 
officers and soldiers of the elite units that that reflected upon their Algerian experience 
and were most critical of their inadequate training. Historian John Shea comments on 
the French operations in Algiers and notes that " ... most of these young men had become 
totally committed to their missions--without adequate preparation, without thorough, 
reasoned instruction, without time to become experienced .... "95 
Further evidence of the frustration felt in regard to inadequate training for the 
urban environment was given of this during the trial of a Captain of the 1st R.E.P. He 
reflected on his preparatory training for Algiers: 
95 John J. Shea, "French Military Thought 1946-1966" (PH.D. diss., Boston University, 
Boston, 1973) 386. 
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I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to do the work of a police inspector. In 
February 1959, in September and October, I received the order to do so. I 
was never taught at Saint-Cyr how to exercise the functions of Prefect of 
Police for a population of about 30,000 inhabitants. In January, February, 
March, 1957, I received the order to do so. I was never taught at Saint-
Cyr to set up the embryo of a municipality, to open schools, to open a 
market. In the Fall of 1959, I received the order to do so. I was never 
taught at Saint-Cyr to disperse insurgent citizens by political means. In 
February 1960, I received the order to do so.96 
Colonel Trinquier remarked that France had become a " ... slave to its training and 
traditions [and] our army has not succeeded in adapting itself to a form of warfare the 
military schools do not yet teach. "97 
The French paras, like their officers had no training in urban operations, although 
a large portion of their operations were conducted in the city of Algiers in 1957 and 
1958. The 3rd R.P.C. had complete responsibility for all operations in the Casbah. A 
commander of the 3rd Regiment of Colonial Parachutists (R.P.C.), disgusted with the 
training of his men, marched them " .. .into the bled, for two months of back-breaking 
training ... ,"98 only to return to the urban environment to conduct operations. Even 
knowing the paras would return to Algiers to conduct operations, the commander choose 
to train his soldiers in an environment he was accustomed. 
The soldiers of the paras and the Legion in Algiers were no longer chasing the 
enemy in the hinterland, but now doing standard police operations in the Casbah. These 
96 Maurice Cottaz, Les Proces du putsch d'avril et du complot de Paris (Paris: Nouvelles 
Edition Latines, 1962), 80 cited in Shea, French Military Thought. 1946-1966, 387. 
97 Trinquier, Modem Warefare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 61. 
98 Home, A Savage War of Peace 168. 
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soldiers were now conducting a mission that they had not trained for, nor did they want 
to be. John Talbott observes that: 
... for all their likening of themselves to the police, the paratroops wanted 
no lessons from them. One· police official noted that the army protested 
its own inexperience and then ignored the advice the police offered. 
Army officers complained that police officials did nothing but duck their 
own responsibilities and criticize the military's methods. 99 
It was not until two years after the start of the insurgency that the senior leaders 
recognized the deficiency in training for the preparation of their commanders in Algeria. 
In March of 1956, the French opened the Center for the Teaching of Pacification and 
Counter-Guerrilla in Arzew, Oran province. This school was a twelve day "pre-
command" course designed to prepare officers for command positions in Algeria. As it 
was originally set up 1956, the curriculum focused only on the operational aspects 
of the ongoing situation in Algeria. By only studying the empirical data, the future 
commanders were learning to be reactive to the situation as opposed to proactive. 100 
Another change came about in the center's curriculum with another change of 
directors. In late 1959, a new director, with a good portion of his career and vast 
experience in Northern Africa, saw serious flaws in the program at the center. He noted 
that there were few classes on Islamic culture or Algerian life. 101 It was during this 
period when the military leadership started to take a hard look at their own capacity and 
understand that it would take more than just the military, or "mere combat" to win the 
99 John Talbott, The War Without A Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,1980) 85. 
100 Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 176. 
101 Ibid., 177. 
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war. Therefore, the center restructured the curriculum and divided the training period 
into three phases; the Algerian problem, population protection, and pacification. 
The second phase of training consisted of population protection. This served as 
an introductory course on the how to use intelligence. Intelligence officers were trained 
separately in counterinsurgency techniques at the territorial level. 102 Some of this 
training focused on urban operations. The military officers learned how best to utilize 
police-secours, or police help, during urban operations. It should be noted that the 
military would usually use the police only in a defensive role after an attack or bombing 
took place. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The French ended the urban campaign in a relatively short period of time. 
Tactically, French operations were a huge success. Nine months after the ALN began 
their campaign of urban terror, the French Paras had effectively ended the urban 
uprising. The FLN infrastructure in Algiers was rendered ineffective throughout the rest 
of the campaign. But how could the French be so successful tactically and operationally, 
and lose the conflict at the political level? 
The French Paras dismissed Clausewitz's dictum that war is but an extension of 
politics, and the inherent link between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of 
war. The memory of defeat in Indochina made them determined to "win" in Algeria. 
They would do what they new best--fight the enemy. The French paras clearly 
102 Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 180. 
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understood how to fight the enemy--what they didn't understand was how to beat him. 
Tactics utilized in Algiers polarized the Algerian population, as well as the French 
population. 
As the paras tried to come to grips with insurgency, many officers tried to capture 
its essence in Ia guerre revolutionnaire--a theoretical framework for this type of war. Of 
all their searches, inquisitiveness, and questioning to find solutions to alleviate future 
problems, they continued to view the conflict through the prism of Indochina. They 
framed the problem from the rural perspective. They neglected to think about the effects 
of the enemy carrying this type of warfare into the city, with all of its inherent challenges 
and complexities-- that is until they found themselves tasked to do the mission. Needless 
to say, the paras had no doctrine to guide their future actions so they relied on past 
experiences. 
The paras did make operational adjustments as the conflict progressed, 
particularly as the emphasis moved to Algiers. They created new organizations and 
placed emphasis on concepts that had been given little consideration in the past such as 
psychological operations. Many of these ad hoc organizations and extemporaneous 
methods did meet some measure of success, but in many instances proved to be too little, 
too late, or even disastrous, like the use of torture. 
Intelligence was another area in which the paras understood its importance, but 
made faulty tactical decisions on how to acquire it. The French understood that 
intelligence collection is most vital to the success of an insurgency war. More 
importantly, an intelligence war not against another conventional force, but against an 
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asymmetrical enemy deeply rooted in the population. The French quickly learned that 
their high-tech equipment like telephone taps and signal intercept equipment was negated 
in the urban environment against a low-tech enemy that used runners and dead drops to 
communicate. Operations in Algiers quickly pointed to the need for an expanded human 
intelligence requirement. 
The paras entered Algiers as a seasoned combat fighting force. They quickly 
found that all of their training and combat experience did little to prepare them for the 
urban environment. They had focused their training on what they knew best-chasing and 
fighting the enemy in the bled. The French officers failed in preparing their soldiers to 
operate in the extremely taxing environment of the city. 
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V. THE URUGUAYANS IN MONTEVIDEO 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Tupamaros' insurgency in Uruguay between 1962 and 1972 attacked one of 
the most liberal democracies in South America. Uruguay was a prosperous democracy 
which had experienced little civil violence. However, as economic conditions worsened 
in the 1950s, the Uruguayan government found it extremely difficult to meet the needs of 
its people. Leftist organizations acknowledged that it was time for a change and sought 
to capitalize on the growing economic distress of the population. If power could not be 
won through the electoral process they concluded, then more violent methods were 
needed. The Tupamaros resorted to assassination, political kidnapping, attacks against 
the government, and terror. 
B. INSURGENCY 
1. History 
The war between the Tupamaros, 103 officially known as the Movimiento de 
Liberacion National (MLN), and the Uruguayan police and military, serves as a classic 
example of the problems faced by a government confronted with an insurgency that 
chose to fight in the city. 
103 The Tupamaros derive this name from Tupac Amaro, the famous Incan rebel who led 
a rebellion against the Spanish. The Spanish defeated the rebellion and he was executed. 
The Spanish then called all members of rebel groups throughout South America, 




Although the conflict only erupted in 1962, the Tupamaros traced their origins to 
the 1950s when Uruguay's economic conditions worsened and the country witnessed a 
rise in social discontent. Uruguay's economy was based almost exclusively on a meat 
and wool export industry. The end Korean War in 1953 brought a collapse in prices for 
both commodities on the world market. The subsequent inflation, rising unemployment 
and underemployment, and mass immigration from the countryside into the cities, 
especially Montevideo, created conditions which the MLN believed were ripe for 
revolution. 
The MLN developed out of the Artigas Sugar Workers Union (UTAA) and was 
organized by former lawyer Raul Sendic Antonaccio, to respond to violations of social 
laws designed to protect the workers from the abuses of the large rice and sugar 
companies. When the UTTA met with minimal success, the worker's union joined ranks 
with political leftist from the Socialist Party in Uruguay to form the MLN in 1962.
104 
2. Ideology and Goals 
For several reasons, the Tupamaros never put forth an ideological platform in any 
communique or dissertation. First, they believed that their actions would to bring 
attention to their cause. Second, they did not want to lock themselves into an ideological 
position that they might have to modify later on in response to a changed political 
104 Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," Problems of Communism, 20 
(September/October 1971) 15. 
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situation. Finally, they sought to appeal across a broad spectrum of the population. They 
did not want to limit themselves to any distinct social class or group. 105 
Although Uruguay had been an independent nation for almost 150 years, the 
Tupamaros argued that Uruguay and its ruling elites were nothing more than mere 
puppets of the United States, Great Britain, and the Brazil-Argentina axis. The primary 
goal of the Tupamaros was to create a strong Uruguayan nationalist identity. Their 
second goal was to establish a more equitable socioeconomic system. This they believed, 
could be more effectively accomplished under a socialist system. The total liberation of 
Uruguay from foreign domination, and the influence of economic classes subservient, in 
their view, to foreign interests was a necessary pre-condition for their socialistic society. 
Only through socialism would total liberation from the imperialistic powers take place. 
3. Strategy 
Uruguayan geography largely dictated the Tupamaros' urban-based strategy. 
Uruguay has no remote mountains or dense jungles to provide the insurgents with safe 
refuge. More importantly, Uruguay's population was highly urbanized. Almost eighty-
seven percent of the population lived in the cities. Fifty percent of the nation's 
population lived in Montevideo. The MLN leadership recognized that to be near the 
"masses," they had to focus on the city. This strategic consideration was made out of 
necessity, not by choice: 
105 Arthuro C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, (New York: Praeger, 1973) 1. 
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The choice of battleground in Uruguay was probably determined first and 
foremost by metropolitan area of Montevideo, which contains about 
one-half of the country's 2.9 million inhabitants, [and] 
provides .... vulnerable targets and invulnerable hideouts.
106 
As pointed out in an interview of a Tupamaros member: 
... we do not have unassailable strongholds in our country where a lasting 
guerrilla nucleus can be installed .. on the other hand, we have a large city 
with buildings covering more than three hundred s~uare kilometers and 
that allows for the development of an urban struggle. 1 7 
The Tupamaros were quick to realize that the urban battlefield offered other 
positive advantages, the most obvious being access to the news media. If the Tupamaros 
calculated their acts of violence to capture maximum publicity, then the government 
could not hide the fact that a revolutionary war was taking place in its capital city, either 
from the local populace or the international community. 
Another assumption upon which the Tupamaros based their strategy was that the 
masses were ripe for revolution. However, they were apathetic and without leadership. 
What was required to stir the people to action were acts of political violence. 
Political violence was the means and strategy in which the Tupamaros attempted 
to reach their goals and objectives. Two revolutionary theorists who proved to be the 
most influential on the MLN were Abraham Guillen and Carlos Marighela. Both 
theorists espoused the urban guerrilla strategy and believed that it was possible to raise 
106 Jack Davis, Political Violence in Latin America, Adelphi Paper no. 85 (London: IISS, 
1972) 18. 
107 Brian M. Jenkins, An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1972)2. 
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an army of liberation in the city. 108 It was only through the use of violence that they felt 
they could create the conditions for change. They adopted Carlos Marighela's view that 
.. .it becomes necessary to turn the political crisis into armed conflict by 
performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the 
political situation of the country into a military situation that will alienate 
the masses, who from then on, will revolt against the army and the 
police. " 109 
The Tupamaros quickly summized that Uruguayan authorities enjoyed little popular 
support, and were propped up by a narrow base of military forces. "The three forces 
[Army, Navy, and Air Force] together comprised a bare 17,000 badly trained and 
equipped men."110 It was the MLN's view that violent actions on their part would do one 
of two things: If the government failed to react or failed to be effective in their reaction, 
or revolutionary violence would force the government to overreact with excessive and 
repressive measures, giving legitimacy to the Tupamaros cause. Then this would 
demonstrate to the people the weakness of the regime. 
The Tupamaros justified their use of violence as a sort of "revolutionary legality." 
That is it was legal for the government to use violent methods to stay in power, then the 
108 Spanish born Abraham Guillen was one of first revolutionary theorists of the urban 
guerrilla strategy. After he emigrated to Latin America, his writings provided the greatest 
influence on Carlos Marighella. Both theorists were firm believers in "Che" Guevera 
and Regis Debray's foco theory. They believed that a dedicated armed guerrilla force 
could initiate a struggle without waiting for any particular set of conditions to exist. 
Where Guillen and Marighella differed from Guevara and Debray is that the former 
believed that this could take place in the city while the latter believed that the emphasis 
had to be in rural areas. 
109 Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," Appendix to Moss, Urban 
Guerrilla Warfare, 26. 
no Alain Labrousse, The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay. (Middlesex: 
Penguin,1973) 20. 
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Tupamaros were within their moral rights to employ violence to overthrow an unjust 
government. Although the Tupamaros recognized weaknesses in the regime's security 
forces, they also recognized that, in the short term, they lacked the power to defeat the 
government by conventional military means. Guerrilla war, in their estimation, was the 
way to enlist the masses in their cause. In essence, the Tupamaros' "theory of victory:" 
... meant that a military and political struggle spearheaded by the 
Tupamaro urban guerrillas would be turned into a popular uprising, and 
insurrection of the masses, and a true revolutionary experience. Power 
would be seized, and the necessary foundations for the attainment of 
nationalism and socialism, could at long last be built. 111 
Needless to say, this Tupamaro "theory of victory" required a revolutionary leap of faith 
in the willingness of the population to take the streets in revolt. 
Also included in the MLN' s "theory of victory" was the belief that outside forces 
would intervene to tip the war in their favor. The Tupamaros leadership counted on 
international intervention from two sources. Regionally, Argentina and Brazil agreed to 
invade Uruguay if the Tupamaros came to power. Internationally, the possibility of 
intervention came from the United States. The Tupamaros were encouraged by this 
possibility because "the struggle would take on one of national character against an 
invading army."112 This introduction of an outside intervening force would allow the 
Tupamaros to portray themselves as the standard of national liberation. 
In the event of foreign military intervention, the Tupamaros would use the city to 
their advantage. Their strategy called for retreating deep within Montevideo, luring the 
m Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 25. 
112 Donald C. Hodges and Robert Shanab, "Interview with a Leader of Uruguay's MLN," 
National Liberation Fronts 1960/1970, (New York: William Morrow, 1972) 284. 
72 
intervention force deep into the city, then waging their urban guerrilla war. They realized 
the great possibility of suffering some immediate tactical defeats, but clearly understood 
the long term gains of fighting in Montevideo. The movement maintained that 
... foreign intervention can bring a temporary defeat but it will result in a 
political progress which will bring us victory in due course. Imagine the 
city of Montevideo occupied by foreign troops, humiliating our national 
pride and imposing restrictions on the population, and imagine, on the 
other hand, a revolutionary group solidly rooted in the city. 113 
4. Tactics 
Tactics offer the means and tools to achieve strategic and political goals. Tactics, 
in a revolutionary sense, are not so much a question of defeating the regime's security 
forces in a conventional sense, as they are meant to weaken the legitimacy of the regime 
and its security forces in the eyes of the populace. In "stability and support operations," 
"perceived" reduction in the regime's power by the populace, or by outside powers, is as 
important as any real reduction in strength. They create the impression that the 
government is losing control which encourages the revolution, undermines the faith in 
victory of government supporters, and sways the neutral middle ground. 
Between 1963 and 1968, the Tupamaros conducted robberies and raids on banks 
and storehouses to secure money, arms, and supplies while developing the infrastructure 
of their organization. The MLN had a compartmentalized organization divided into the 
cell, column, Executive Committee, and the National Convention. The cell consisted of 
two to six individuals that served either as the action arm or an administrative and 
113 Labrouse, The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay, 141. 
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logistical function. Several cells were grouped into columns and were responsible for 
coordinating the activities of those cells within a geographical area. The Executive 
Committee, whose members were selected by the National Convention, was the decision 
making body of the organization and provided the overall direction of the military and 
political campaign. The National Convention was the overall governing body of the 
MLN. The National Committee was eventually phased out and the Executive Committee 
took over the exclusive direction of the revolution. 114 The compartmentalization of the 
cells and the columns allowed for tight security at the lower level of the organization. 
Security was more lax at the top of the organization, a serious flaw which would 
eventually lead to the breakup of the Tupamaros. 
The Tupamaros received very little external support. They believed that the 
insurgency should be financed by excesses of the rich in Uruguay. The Tupamaros 
hijacked trucks carrying food, and delivered them to the poor and needy in the slums of 
Montevideo. 1 15 The publicity they reaped from these types of actions did much to build 
their "Robin Hood" image as friends to the poor and added credibility to their cause in 
the eyes of the population. The majority of arms were stolen from private gun collectors 
and gun shops. Raids on military installations also provided arms, ammunition, and 
explosives. Some cross-border smuggling of arms did take place from neighboring 
Argentina and BraziL 116 
114 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 32-34, 
115 James A. Miller, "Urban Terrorism in Uruguay: The Tupamaros," in Bard E. O'Neill, 
William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts eds., Insurgency in the Modem World 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980) 139. 
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In 1968, the Tupamaros moved to a new phase by directly attacking the 
government. Their main techniques were propaganda, terror, and sabotage. The 
Tupamaros effectively used two types of propaganda: "armed propaganda" and 
"countermedia." "Armed propaganda" was an idea espoused by French revolutionary 
theorist Regis Debray, and implemented with great success by the MLN. "Armed 
propaganda" consisted of actions intended to demonstrate weakness and lack of 
credibility in the government and its security forces, and to demonstrate the strength of 
the guerrilla forces and prove that the Tupamaros were a viable force. Political 
kidnapping was the most effective form of armed propaganda for the Tupamaros. 
Although ransoms were collected most of the time, that was not the primary intent. They 
used political kidnappings as a form of propaganda to demonstrate how powerful the 
MLN was and to show the weakness of the regime. Victims were held in what became 
known as "people's jails" in and around Montevideo. As government forces were 
seldom able to find these victims, they resorted to harsher methods of searches. As the 
Tupamaros calculated, these searches alienated the population. "Counter-media" was 
simply conveying the Tupamaros message to the public through speeches, lectures, and 
demonstrations. It was during many of these speeches that the MLN leadership were able 
to denounce the corruption of government officials. 117 
Terror was used by the MLN. The MLN used terror to "directly" affect the 
person who it was aimed at, or they would employ it "indirectly" at friends and family of 
the intended recipient. The idea was to make it dangerous to serve the government, 
117 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 43-46. 
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hence driving people into neutrality. Apathy and neutrality favored the Tupamaros by 
further undermining the legitimacy of the government. Finally, sabotage was seldom 
employed by the MLN, for fear of hurting the population and hence losing their support. 
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
1. History and Nature of the Regime 
The Uruguayan Government faced the same problem in the early sixties that 
many countries may have to face in the future in terms of urban counterinsurgent 
strategies. What is the correct mix of police and conventional/SOP military forces? 
Should the police spearhead the main effort of the overall counterinsurgent urban 
campaign with the military supporting or vice versa? The Uruguayan Government had 
no previous experience with counterguerrilla operations. They had neither to think about 
nor deal with the urban aspects of counterguerrilla or counterinsurgent operations. This 
inexperience was evident in the early years of the conflict, so much so that the 
Uruguayan government was forced to change strategies midway from a failed "police 
first-military support" to a "military first-police support" strategy. 
2. Forces Available and Initial Response 
a. Police 
For the Uruguayan government, the logical choice to counter the urban 
insurgency was the National Police which fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Interior. Between 1962 and 1970, the National Police were given primacy responsibility 
76 
for carrying out the counterinsurgent campaign against the MLN, although they were ill-
equipped and ill-trained for such operations. 118 "Very few army officers or policemen 
had received specialised training on counter-insurgency techniques."119 Because of the 
police unpreparedness, the Tupamaros were able to expand their urban base of support. 
Additionally, the way in which the National Police conducted operations seriously eroded 
much of the support they had from the population. Their lack of preparation handed the 
Tupamaros successes which their lack of organization would not normally have allow 
them. Frustrated by their lack of success, the police responded with ever more extreme 
and repressive measures. 
One consequence of the ineffectiveness of police tactics was the decision 
to create the Metropolitan Guard in 1968. The Metropolitan Guard, which numbered 600 
men led by army officers, was considered Uruguay's "elite" police unit. The placing of 
regular army officers in charge of this unit provided the first step toward the 
militarization of the conflict. The Metropolitan Guard was a highly trained paramilitary 
unit that received specialized training from both the United States and Brazil in all types 
of light weapons and crowd control techniques. 120 They normally played a supporting 
role in the police counterinsurgency campaign and served as the reserve or a quick 
reactionary force (QRF) to the National Police. When the National Police came into 
118 See Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 53. The National Police were the logical 
choice because of the high numbers of police that operate in the urban environment. 
Forty percent of the 17,000 police were assigned to urban areas. Twenty percent of the 
total force were assigned to Montevideo, the base ofMLN operations. 
119 Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence, (London: 
Temple Smith, 1972) 219. 
120 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 55. 
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contact with the Tupamaros, the Metropolitan Guard was called in to provide back-up. 
The Metropolitan Guard gained the reputation as a repressive force using such techniques 
as torture and citywide searches. 121 
b. Military 
Throughout the period from 1962 through 1971, the Uruguayan military 
limited its role in the counterinsurgent operations to civic action programs. On 
September 9, 1971, President Bordaberry transferred primary responsibility of the 
counterinsurgency effort from the police to the military. The police had proven 
ineffective in previous years in quelling the insurgents in Montevideo. In fact, the 
Tupamaros were probably at their strongest when the military took control of operations. 
The military fell under the Ministry of Defense and numbered only about 
17,000 officers and soldiers in 1970. Of that, 12,000 made up the army consisting of 
"nine horse and mechanized calvary squadrons (with light and medium tanks), six 
infantry battalions, six field artillery battalions, and six engineer battalions. " 122 All air 
assets fell under the Air Force, but the army had control over the two air force UH-12 
transport helicopters for their QRF. The military, like the police, had little experience 
and training in counterinsurgency operations in the urban environment when it took over 
operations. 
121 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 55. 
122 Ibid., 170 
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The Ministry of Defense immediately saw the need to increase readily 
available resources for the counterinsurgency campaign. The creation of a joint staff 
aimed primarily to coordinate the military intelligence efforts by combining the resources 
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the those of the police. This joint staff was 
an innovative idea for the Uruguayan military, resulting in "better quality and quantity 
intelligence inputs. "123 
The Minister of Defense mandated the creation of additional organizations 
that were to be focused wholly on the counterinsurgency effort. These organizations 
were the Board of Commanders in Chief (JCJ), Joint Staff (ESMACO), Coordinating 
organizations for Antisubversive Operations (OCOA), Intelligence Coordination Meeting 
(RI), and the Joint Forces Press Bureau (OPFC). 
The JCJ and ESMACO were created in December of 1971, three months 
after the military took over operations. JCJ's purpose was to serve as advisory board to 
the President on joint counterinsurgent activities. ESMACO's role was to study, plan, 
coordinate and advise the JCJ counterinsurgency effort. The creation of these 
organizations allowed for a high level centralized agency that oversaw the whole national 
effort, not just the military or the police. 124 
The OCOA was the joint staff within each of the Military Regions that 
planned and coordinated counterinsurgency efforts within that region. OCOA was 
actually the forerunner for ESMACO. OCOA began operations in June of 1971 with 
123 Miller, "Urban Terrorism in Uruguay: The Tupamaros," 171. 
124 Sergio L. d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, 53, no.4 
(April, 1973) 36. 
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immediate results. They coordinated the operational intelligence at the tactical level as 
well as the logistical support for the counterinsurgency effort. The RI was the 
intelligence community's meeting in which information and intelligence assets were 
shared between the services and the police, resulting in more complete information .. In 
addition to the valuable exchange of information, coordination imposed a much needed 
doctrinal unity within the intelligence community. 
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The OPFC was main agency of the military's psychological effort against 
the Tupamaros. The agency used national radio and television stations to publicize the 
government's position and keep the public abreast of the success against the MLN. This 
organization was created very late in counterinsurgency effort. The impact of an 
effective psychological effort was demonstrated in the seventies when the military 
captured MLN documents. These documents were " ... expertly exploited, and public 
support for ... the Tupamaros plunged precipitously."126
 
The Uruguayan army had little in the way of counterinsurgency
127 or 
urban doctrine when the MLN began operations in Montevideo. They had doctrine for 
combat operations, but they rarely practiced or used it. In the sixties: 
125 d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myt~" 36. 
126 R. D. McLaurin and R. Miller, Urban Insurgency: Case Studies and Implications for 
U.S. Military Forces, (Springfield, Va: Abbott Associates 1989) 131. 
127 Counterinsurgency doctrine falls under what the United States now calls the IDAD 
strategy in "stability and support operations." 
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... the Uruguayan military increasingly found itself involved in law 
enforcement activities and becoming an active rather than passive back-up 
forces to the country's National Police. Soldiers were often called to 
patrol Montevideo streets and guard communications centers, power 
facilities, commercial banks, and government buildings. 128 
This caused a division among the military officers between those who rejected the role of 
law enforcement for the military and others who welcomed it as a necessary and 
important mission. 129 
The National Police intelligence collection effort, both in the gathering 
and the collation, was almost non-existent, and what Robert Moss identified "as the 
"crux" of the problem in dealing with the Tupamaros."130 The military created ad hoc 
organizations to facilitate intelligence collection needs, which as it turned out, was the 
military's primary role during the conflict. To their advantage, the military learned many 
lessons from the National Police experiences in the sixties. During a Tupamaros cease 
fire from September 1971 to April 1972, the Army Intelligence Service (AIS) began 
planning and making preparations for the military's counterinsurgency effort. They were 
quick to assess that past police operational failures were really intelligence failures. 
Previously, the police had little intelligence on the MLN to conduct effective 
128 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p.55. 
129 See Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p.67. The commander-in-chief of the 
Military Region no. 1, which includes Montivideo, resigned in 1968 because he felt his 
soldiers were being misutilized. 
130 See James A. Miller, "Urban Terrorism in Uruguay: The Tupamaros," in Bard E. 
O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts eds., Insurgency in the Modern World 
(Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1980) 168-9. See also Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The 
New Face of Political Violence, 232. 
81 
counterinsurgent operations against them. Therefore, the police relied heavily on 
sweeping citywide searches to find kidnap victims and MLN members. Not only were 
these broad sweeps ineffective, they had a detrimental political impact. For instance, in 
August of 1970, the police conducted 20,000 house searches at all hours of the night and 
without warrants. This caused resentment against the authorities and aided the 
Tupamaros in gaining at least the tacit support of the population. With more precise 
intelligence, the AIS was able to use " .. .information provided the police's Information 
and Intelligence Directorate" to locate Tupamaros as well as targeting MLN 
infrastructure. 131 
The Uruguayan Government took measures to assist the National Police 
by seeking financial and training aid internationally. The primary assistance came from 
the United States through the Agency of International Development (AID). Financial 
assistance was used primarily to upgrade transportation and communications. Training 
focused on patrolling capabilities, investigative procedures, and riot control. Much of 
training of the police took place in Uruguay, although some officers were sent to the 
United States for training. 132 Although the Uruguayan National Police received vast 
amounts financial support and training aid, there was a severe lack of training in such 
areas as intelligence, counterintelligence, and psychological warfare. 
The Uruguayan Army received its biggest break in its attempt to defeat the 
Tupamaros in 1972 when it captured H. Amodio Perez, a Tupamaros leader. It was 
131 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 67. 
132 Ibid., 53. 
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Perez's collaboration that proved to be the striking blow leading to the defeat of the 
Tupamaros. He provided information about other personnel, weapon caches, 
documentation centers, and locations of hostages. 133 This proved to be the culminating 
event which led to the defeat of the Tupamaros. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
To suggest that either a change in tactics by the Uruguayan security forces or that 
tactical or operational failures on the part of the Tupamaros led to their defeat is 
simplistic. War is an interactive process. There were a number of reasons from both 
perspectives which account for the Tupamaros defeat. 
From the Tupamaros perspective, tactical advantage was squandered and 
transformed into strategic defeat. For example, the kidnap and brutal murders of U.S. 
advisor Dan Mitrione and British Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Jackson began in a shift of 
public support away from the Tupamaros. This tactical success in the abduction and 
hostage phase was undermined once they resorted to murder. The MLN' s execution of 
Operation Hot Summer in 1971, was which aimed to inflict damage on the Uruguayan 
summer tourist industry, proved to be a tactical success. The Tupamaros again 
miscalculated the strategic consequences because of a significant percentage the labor 
force ,engaged in the tourist industry that was laid off, which hardly served to popularize 
the Tupamaros cause among the segment of the "masses." 
133 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 69. 
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The entrance of the military in the counterinsurgency effort demonstrated a shift 
of emphasis in government strategy. The army had no urban or counterinsurgency 
doctrine as a basis from which to plan a campaign against the Tupamaros. Even during 
the time the police were in charge of the campaign, the military did little to plan for such 
operations in the event they should be asked to take over. In the years leading up to the 
military's assumption of the primary role in fighting the Tupamaros were characterized 
by extraordinary complacency. Their lack of doctrine and training for this type of war in 
this environment was evidence in the way they conducted operations; large scale 
searches, roadblocks, and checkpoints that appeared to be an excessive use of force 
which disturbed daily life. It was not until the military was given full control of the 
operations that organizational and doctrinal changes were made. To the military's credit, 
they quickly understood that this was above all an intelligence war. The Minister of 
Defense was quick to make organizational changes to support this. 
Psychological operations was not a part of the government's response until near 
the end of the counterinsurgency campaign. Once the military learned how effectively to 
employ them, they ultimately helped to win support for the government. 
The military was very involved in Civil Affairs during the period from 1962 
through 1971. Once the army assumed full responsibility for the counterinsurgency 
campaign, the civic action programs dwindled. Psychological operations on the 
military's part were neglected and no attempt was made to portray the military as the ally 
and protector of the population. 
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Lack of training in urban counterinsurgency was clearly demonstrated by their ad 
hoc approach to operations. Their immediate response was to quell the situation as 
quickly as possible. This led to conduct large scale conventional operations that were 
considered repressive by the population--large scale sweeps of the city, searches of 
homes at all hours of the night, and interruption of the daily routine of the urban 
populace. 
The army's use of large numbers of conventional units as the primary 
counterinsurgent force gave the government a repressive image. "Elite" units served in a 
supporting role and were the reserve or QRF. Had the Uruguayan Army reversed this, 
and used smaller elite forces in its search for the MLN leadership, with conventional 
forces in the reserve role, the populace might have been more receptive. 
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VI. THE BRITISH IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
A. BACKGROUND 
Violence has long been a inherent part of the political fabric of Northern Ireland. 
In 1969, a new wave of civil violence broke out in Northern Ireland. This violence, a 
result of rising unemployment and discrimination against the Catholic population, started 
in the city streets of Londonderry, and quickly spread to Belfast, Northern Ireland's major 
city. The British Army, already garrisoned in Northern Ireland, were called on to assist 
the police in protecting the Catholic population from Protestant violence. However, 
within six months, the army and the police had become objects of attack by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). 
Both Catholics and Protestants alike initially welcomed the military intervention. 
The Catholics saw the British Army as an impartial force that would apply justice equally 
to both parties. The Protestants viewed British presence as support for their policies 
against the Catholic population and a force that would help their police units put an end 
to Catholic demonstrations and rioting in the streets. As British forces became more 
deeply entrenched in operations, the appearance of favoring the Protestants added fuel to 
the Irish fire for their quest for a free and independent Ireland. 
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B. THE INSURGENCY 
1. History 
Conflict in Ireland is hardly a new phenomena. The traditional English-Irish 
conflict was complicated by religious divisions within Ireland between Protestants who 
remain fiercely loyal to Britain, and Catholics whose attitudes toward Irish independence 
were more complex. The IRA emerged as the most militant representative of Catholic 
emancipation within a united, independent Ireland. The origins of the IRA dates back to 
the mid-nineteenth century but it was not until the struggle for independence from 1916 
to 1921 that the IRA emerged as an organization capable of carrying on the Irish 
Nationalist fight. In 1921, Ireland was partitioned into two separate states: the three 
counties in the south forming the Irish Free State, and the six northern counties forming 
Northern Ireland with a Protestant majority and Catholic minority. Throughout the 
twentieth century, the strength of the IRA has risen and receded numerous times. In the 
early 1960s, the IRA began to adopt a Marxist philosophy and economic and political 
action became more important than violent action. 134 As the civil rights movement of 
the late 1960s turned increasingly violent, however, many within the IRA became 
disenchanted with the organization and its ability to protect the Catholic community. 
Members who split from the split from the Official IRA in 1969 became known 
as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The PIRA has led the insurgency 
against British presence in Northern Ireland. 
134 The Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC), Northern Ireland: Reappraising 
Republican Violence, (London: ISC, 1982) 3. 
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2. Ideology and Goals 
The PIRA's ideology and political goals stated in their official manual, the Green 
Book, is to establish " ... an Irish Socialist Republic based on the 1916 Proclamation."135 
The 1916 Proclamation, a document resulting from the "Easter Rising" in Dublin, lends 
credence to the PIRA claim to be the true protector of the nationalist struggle in Northern 
Ireland, whose purpose is to unite Ulster to the three provinces which form the Irish 
Republic. 
3. Strategy 
To attain their goals, the PIRA has followed a strategy of political violence. The 
strategy as outlined in the PIRA's "Green Book" consists of a campaign of bombing 
which seeks to make Northern Ireland ungovernable, extend PIRA control over the 
Catholic community, and inflict unacceptable casualties on the British which will cause 
them to tire of the conflict and leave. Finally, the hope to attract support for their 
insurgency abroad. 
The bombing campaign was designed for a dual purpose. First, to make it appear 
as though the six northern counties of Ulster are ungovernable except by colonial rule. 
This promotes feelings in the populace of Northern Ireland that the British government 
cannot protect them and that the vanguard of Irish security is only through the PIRA. 
Secondly, it is aimed at the country's economic interests, as well as bringing terror to 
Irish Loyalists and to the population of Great Britain. This would make it unprofitable 
135 ISC, Northern Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence, 6. 
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for Irish businessmen from displaying any public support for the British, and to curb any 
future British long term investment. 
The second pillar of their strategy is to expand support within the Catholic 
community. Prior to 1981, the PIRA carried on an intense terrorist campaign, believing 
that terrorism by itself, would be enough to achieve its objectives. The PIRA altered this 
strategy in 1981, after Bobby Sands, a convicted PIRA terrorist, won a seat in the House 
of Commons. That political win gave the Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), the political wing 
of the PIRA, the realization of the importance of the political wing and its ability to 
expand a base of support. This new strategy became known as the "ballot box and the 
Armalite." The "ballot box and the Armalite" strategy is reinforced by terror. This form 
of terror, using such infamous methods as "kneecapping," is employed against the very 
same population the PIRA claims to protect. 
The war of attrition was aimed at the British government, causing the withdrawal 
of the British occupation forces. In the context of the attrition of British resolve, the 
PIRA has used a combination of urban and rural strategies, but its focus has been on the 
urban areas, not only in own country, but in Britain and on the European Continent. 
London has been an especially favorite target for the PIRA. It has been said that, "one 
bomb in London is worth ten in Belfast." By taking the bombing campaign to Great 
Britain and the Continent, the PIRA leadership hopes to capitalize on publicity and 
weaken British resolve without threatening their supporters. This campaign outside of 
Northern Ireland was designed to make up for the mistakes and accidental deaths of 
innocent Catholics within Ulster. 
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Internationalization of the PIRA's war, as in any sub-state actor's war, is to gain 
moral and financial support for their cause through propaganda and publicity. This 
internationalization is intended to have the international Irish Catholic community apply 
pressure to Britain for its withdrawal and to receive money and weapons from countries 
like Libya. 
4. Tactics 
Northern Ireland has been " ... a veritable laboratory for the development of tactics 
and techniques of terrorism ... ," for the PIRA. 136 Tactics employed to achieve their 
strategic goals have primarily targeted the British Army, the Ulster Security Forces, 
prison and judicial officials and Loyalist political party members . 
Shootings, bombings, and mortar attacks are the favorite weapons used in the 
PIRA's tactical inventory. Against British government and its security forces, the PIRA 
has become very adept in the use of radio-controlled and time delay bombs, as well as 
booby-traps, car bombs, improvised grenades, and mortars. When bombing public 
places, the PIRA's modus operandi has been to make a call ahead of time to allow people 
a chance to get out. If innocents are killed, the PIRA blames the government for not 
reacting in a timely manner. 
During the early 1970s, the PIRA was modeled and organized after a 
conventional army structure with brigades, battalions, and companies as its operational 
units. As the PIRA shifted it operations to the urban areas, the organization became 
136 ISC, Northern Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence, 8. 
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susceptible to infiltration by British security forces. These operational units were well 
known to the local populace, which was also a threat to their security. Therefore, in the 
late 1970s, the PIRA switched to a clandestine, cellular organization that provide more 
security and was more difficult to penetrate by the security forces. The operational units 
of the cells are called Active Service Units (ASU), which carry out the actual attacks 
against the British. These ASUs consist of five to twelve members and represent the 
hare-core terrorist. The ASUs are supported by a volunteer force that takes care of 
logistics and an auxiliary force that support tasks such as drivers, lookouts, and weapon 
disposal. 
The PIRA is one of the most heavily armed terrorist organizations in the world 
today. In the past it has received financial support through the North American Irish 
National Aid Committee (NORAID), and support from Libya's Muammar Qaddafi in the 
form of finances and weapons. The Libyans provided the PIRA with an extensive arsenal 
of Armalite and AK47 assault rifles. The PIRA has become extremely adept at 
producing improvised munitions. Although the PIRA has received some financial 
support from Libya, most financial support is raised internally through racketeering, 
extortion, and taxfraud, as well as legitimate businesses. 
C. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
1. Police 
The police were unable to cope with the situation that erupted in the streets of 
Northern Ireland in 1969. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), established in 1922 
92 
after partition, proved to be ineffective. The RUC was a Protestant force, hence they 
were distrusted by the Catholic community. The Catholics barricaded streets leading into 
heavily Catholic populated areas, denying access to the security forces. These "no-go" 
areas were off-limits to the police as well as the military when they took over operations. 
In the mid-1970s, that the RUC was capable of having primacy in urban security 
operations after overhauling the entire police administration and establishing a criminal 
intelligence system. 
2. Military 
The British Army began operations on the streets of Belfast in Northern Ireland 
on August 15, 1969, in response to the sectarian violence that erupted in the town of 
Londonderry during Civil Rights protest marches, and eventually spread to the streets of 
Belfast. What initially started as a mission sent in to supplement the police to restore 
order quickly turned primarily into a military mission. 137 
By 1969, the British had twenty-five years of "small wars" experience m 
defending the ever-shrinking British empire in places like Malaya, Kenya, and Rhodesia. 
Most of these operations were rural in nature, but the British were offered some exposure 
to urban operations in Jerusalem, Cyprus, and Aden. Still they failed to institutionalize 
the many lessons learned and relied on passing this knowledge through its personnel. 
Their training and doctrinal emphasis was still on fighting the Soviets in the northern 
plains of Germany. 
137 J. Boyer Bell, The Gun in Politics, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
1987) 150. 
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In 1969, the British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland to maintain law and 
order. On August 14, 1969, eighty British soldiers from the Prince of Wales Own 
Regiment were posted to the city of Londonderry as reinforcements for the RUC. As the 
army moved in to assist the police in providing security, the police quickly turned over 
control of operations to the military. The next day, the British government made the 
decision to use troops in Belfast to quell spreading violence. Although the British 
government and military foresaw the possibility of increased participation in Northern 
Ireland, little planning and forethought had gone into the possibility of extended urban 
operations. No city maps were produced because the assumption was that the police 
would spearhead the main effort and the military would be in a supporting role. This 
immediately led to problems. As historian Desmond Hamill notes: 
... the Army knew nothing of the rigid sectarian geography of the city with 
its myriad little side streets wandering haphazardly through sensitive 
Catholic and Protestant areas. The idea had always been that if the Army 
were out on the ground, the civil power would always be there to guide 
it.l38 
What little planning there was produced as hoc measures. . There was no coordinated 
civil/military approach. The plan was that the Army would control certain areas of the 
city while the police controlled other areas. The first full weekend of operations: 
... showed how ill-prepared the Army was to deal with such 
violence ... [since] the Army's experience had always been in colonial 
situations where the rules were simple, the chain of command direct and 
the objective clear. Just what were the soldiers supposed to be doing as 
they moved in some confusion through the streets of Belfast and 
Londonderry?"139 
138 Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984, 
(London: Methuen, 1985) 15. 
139 Ibid., 21. 
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By June of 1970, the PIRA launched a full-scale terrorist campaign targeting 
Protestant officials as well as the British Army. The question now at the forefront of the 
British military was whether they were in Northern Ireland to fight urban guerrillas and 
terrorists or to aid in the maintenance of law and order. The British increasingly 
intensified operations against the PIRA. In July, 1970, the British Army conducted 
sweeps of the Catholic areas aimed at rooting out PIRA members. In one month's time, 
20,000 homes were recklessly searched, alienating even further, the Catholic population 
from the British Army. 
In August, 1971, the British government enacted a "policy of internment." This 
policy allowed the security forces to pick up individuals and hold them on suspicion only, 
without any due process of law. On August 9th, the army launched Operation 
"Demetrius" to enforce the "policy of internment." In the four years this operation took 
place, the British army arrested over 2,000 individuals. The British Army initially saw 
this as a tactical success and a curtailment to PIRA operations. This was an illusion, 
however. This policy, enforced by the British Army, was responsible for two of the most 
violent years in Ireland. Like the FLN in Algiers, the PIRA were very effective in 
exploiting these operations that arrested and held many innocent civilians. Additionally, 
the PIRA made accusations of torture and was able to link it to the internment of 
individuals. 
On January 30, 1972, thirteen civilians were killed by British paratroopers during 
a demonstration in Derry, in what became known as "Bloody Sunday." This action 
marked the beginning of the unconventional war for the British Army. Two months later, 
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the British government announced it would "officially" take total control of the security 
situation in Northern Ireland. July 21, 1979, witnessed "Bloody Friday" in which the 
PIRA detonated nineteen bombs across Belfast killing and injuring innocent civilians. 
Ten days later the British Army launched Operation "Motorman" with the purpose of 
removing the barricades and the opening up of the "no-go" areas. 140 The British 
announced their operation in advance in hopes of little resistance. The British conducted 
the operation with eleven infantry battalions. This was the largest troop concentration so 
far used in Northern Ireland with 21,800 soldiers. The same year, British force numbers 
peaked to meet what was Northern Ireland's worst year of violence. Since that time 
violence has periodically risen and receded. 
Like the French Paras in Algiers and the Uruguayan Army in Montevideo, a 
major problem faced by the British Army in Northern Ireland was the absence of 
adequate intelligence. When the army took over from the undermanned and overworked 
RUC, police files and dossiers on suspects were out of date and their intelligence 
network had been neglected. 141 As in the Algerian and Uruguayan case, information 
collection and intelligence gathering became the military's most formidable task. 
Canadian Author David Charters explains that, " ... the [British] army had to rebuild the 
intelligence apparatus from scratch in a hostile and deteriorating environment."142 The 
140 These "no-go" areas were Catholic dominated sections of towns in which Loyalist 
Security Forces were at peril if they entered. 
141 David A Charters, "Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Operations in Northern 
Ireland," in Alan O'Day ed. Dimensions of Irish Terrorism, (New York: G. K. Hall & 
Co., 1994) 378. 
142 Ibid., 378. 
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consensus among military analysts was that the British Army was slow to realize the 
importance of intelligence. " ... [T]hey should have gone flat out to build up intelligence--
something that was not done satisfactorily for years."143 Once the decision to emphasize 
intelligence was taken, however, the British Army discovered that an adequate 
intelligence system could not be created overnight: 
" ... the Army now started to build up the intelligence system and poured in 
huge sums of money, men, and effort. It would be a long time, however, 
before the full effects were to be appreciated. " 144 
Psychological operations was another aspect in which the British Army placed 
little emphasis in the initial years of the conflict. "The [British] army's psyops resources 
were insignificant at the outbreak of the war, so its efforts tended to be ad hoc."145 The 
PIRA held the initiative in psychological operations until mid-1970s. The PIRA were 
effective in the use of propaganda by turning British military operations like "Demetrius" 
and "Motorman" into a psychological defeats, while turning their own tactical actions 
into psychological wins. 
3. Doctrine 
After World War II, the British underwent serious budget and personnel cutbacks 
in the military. As RAND researchers Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw suggest the 
emphasis of British doctrinal development went to conventional and nuclear deterrent 
143 Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984,34. 
144 Ibid., 52. 
145 Charters, Dimensions of Irish Terrorism, 381. 
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forces. It was not until the Suez Crisis in 1956 " ... that the British fully realized the 
extent to which they had gutted their low-intensity conflict (LIC) capabilities."146 
During the period between the end of World War II and operations in Northern 
Ireland in 1969, the British Army conducted numerous stability and support operations as 
part of their imperial policing of their possessions. During the early phases of each one 
of these operations, " ... there was little coordination of intelligence and no existing 
doctrine to guide action."147 The British were continually "relearning" the lessons from 
each previous effort. British author Desmond Hammill tries to further isolate the 
problem by stating that: 
Over the years ... the Army had developed a counterinsurgency 
doctrine ... that had worked to great effect in the rural areas of Oman, 
Borneo, Malaya and, particularly Kenya. The task was found to be much 
more difficult when these gangs moved into urban areas such as Aden, 
Nicosia, Ismailia and Jerusalem. In these towns and cities soldiers found 
themselves fighting and enemy in plain clothes, indistinguishable from the 
local population and under the gaze of an interested and often adversely 
critical world press. 148 
Commenting on the doctrine used in Northern Ireland, one senior officer that 
commanded British units in Belfast wrote that, "we based our training on the Internal 
Security Pamphlets. They are good but writing with hindsight, they need a new section 
on internal duties in a sophisticated city .... " 149 
146 Bruce Hoffinan and Jennifer Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensitv Conflict: The 
Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s, R-4015-A (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1991) v. 
147 Ibid., v. 
148 Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984, 33. 
149 Norman L. Dodd, "The Corporals' War: Internal Security Operations in Northern 
Ireland," Military Review, 56, no. 7 (July 1976) 62. 
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Many British conventional force commanders were not comfortable with using 
SOF units in Northern Ireland. In fact, many commanders made it known that they did 
not want any Special Air Service (SAS) units in illster at all. Although little is written 
about SAS operations in Northern Ireland, it is known that they only were involved in 
one and two man operations until 1976. Part of the reason for the limited use of a SOF 
unit by British conventional forces in Northern Ireland is " ... owing to a misunderstanding 
of its role, the SAS was misused at first, its special skills wasted because ordinary 
infantry commanders did not know how to use them."150 This is not a new phenomena 
for the British Army. Throughout their numerous post-World War II counterinsurgency 
efforts, the British always opted for "large-scale formal operations .. .in lieu of [the] early 
use of special forces." 151 
4. Training 
The British Army, as an institution, had a vast experience in stability and support 
operations but the emphasis of their training remained in conventional operations in 
support of their NATO mission. Even with some urban experiences in Jerusalem, 
Cyprus, and Aden, and the exposure to the challenges and complexities of operating in 
the urban environment, there was little emphasis place on training for urban operations. 
15° Charters, Dimensions of Irish Terrorism, 379. 
151 Hoffman and Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of 
Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s, vi. 
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Some units were given basic instruction in handling crowds and riot control 
techniques. British Officer Colonel Norman Dodd observed that the: 
... first units that arrived in Northern Ireland were able to effectively deal 
with riot control duties ... but, when the shooting started, it became 
apparent that the situation was deadly serious and would require special 
and concentrated training. 152 
Another British Officer that commanded a battalion in Belfast: 
... felt, after he had been there for some time, that the training had been 
wrong. His men had been trained to be reactive, to patrol and to shoot, 
which he began to think had little relevance to the outcome of an urban 
guerrilla campaign. " 153 
Many of the British officers complained that their soldiers arrived in Northern 
Ireland with "little or no specialist training."154 This would change over time. In 1972, 
the British developed training teams called NITATs. These teams were located in both 
England and Germany to prepare units for rotation into Northern Ireland. The NITATs 
were experienced in operations in Northern Ireland and would conduct training courses 
for units prior to deployment. During the course, soldiers were taught about extremist 
organizations, given detailed intelligence about their specific area of operations, run 
through situational training exercises (STX) that mirrored past incidents that were 
common in their sector, training on ROE, and close quarters firing as well as urban 
patrolling. 
152 Dodd, "The Corporals' War: Internal Security Operations in Northern Ireland," 62. 
153 Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984, 118. 
154 Ibid., 74. 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
The conflict is on-going in Northern Ireland, although today the level of violence 
has greatly subsided. Part of the reason for this has been by decisions of the PSF to seek 
more gains through a political strategy. But the growing effectiveness of the British 
Army and its adaptation of operations in the urban areas is also responsible. 
When the operation evolved from a mission of "aiding" civil authorities in the 
maintenance of law and order to fighting an urban insurgency, they relied on their 
"institutional knowledge" from previous stability and support operations. There was no 
written doctrine to guide their actions, particularly in urban operations. This lack of 
urban doctrine necessitated ad hoc urban tactics and operations which did not coincide 
with the strategic and political objectives. Many of these "off-the-cuff' operations were 
complete disasters and actually promoted increased violence as opposed to its intended 
curbing of violence 
The British military had control of security operations in the urban areas of Ulster 
for almost eight years until primacy was turned back to the RUC. Prior to 1969, the 
British Army assumed that the police would always be in charge of security operations in 
the urban areas, so little thought was put into how forces might best be utilized and what 
approaches could best serve the political goals. 
As in the Uruguayan and the French case, intelligence was the driving force in the 
campaign. As in the other two cases, the British lacked the training and doctrine for well 





As we prepare for the 21st century, the military establishment must begin to think 
seriously about urban operations, particularly in a stability and support operations 
scenario. Demographics, socioeconomic trends, geopolitical factors, as well as strategic, 
operational, and tactical considerations point to the urban environment as a significant, 
perhaps the dominant, battlefield as we transition into the new millennium. Operating in 
the urban environment poses new challenges for the U.S. Army that for the past half 
century has devoted most of its energies and resources, preparing through doctrine and 
training to fight a conventional enemy on topography that favors our technological 
advantage in firepower and maneuver. 
The three cases studies examined in this thesis demonstrate the problems faced by 
military forces suddenly confronted with the complexities fighting in a stability and 
support operation scenario of an urban environment lacking adequate doctrine and 
training for stability and support operations. The U.S. Army today is in a situation 
similar to that of the French, Uruguayan, and British forces studied herein. This should be 
of concern not only for conventional force commanders, but also for ARSOF. In each 
case presented, the military establishment was adopted an ad hoc or "make up as we go 
along" approach, both to the overall conduct of the urban campaign, and with its 
employment of its SOF or "elite" units. The SOF or "elite" units experienced their own 
internal problems, and were either misutilized or neglected altogether during crucial 
periods in a campaign. The price each army, and each nation, paid for the lack of 
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adequate urban doctrine and training was large. The heavy-handed methods of the 
French Paras in the "Battle of Algiers" lost the Algerian war for the French. Arguably, 
the Uruguayan Army won the ten year struggle against the Tupamaros, but the price was 
the overthrow of a democratic government. The jury is still out in Northern Ireland, but 
the lack of preparation of the British Army certainly contributed to the escalating terrorist 
violence there. 
The three case studies point to the need for self evaluation by ARSOF as it 
considers its role in future urban operations. Defense personnel and fiscal constraints, 
together with the increased optempo in stability and support operations, suggest that 
ARSOF will be used more extensively in urban operations in the future than it has in the 
past. If this assumption is true, then it is of utmost importance to begin to think seriously 
about the roles and missions of ARSOF in urban areas. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) or U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)155 should 
write an amplifying doctrinal manual for urban stability and support operations, or we 
should expand our current MOUT doctrine to include stability and support operations. 
Without such a manual, military planners can only resort to ad hoc approaches and 
solutions to urban operations and the employment of ARSOF. This may very well lead to 
conducting tactical operations that actually undermine the overall strategic and political 
objectives of a campaign. This phenomena was clearly evident in all three case studies. 
Some argue that the United States may have already witnessed this in our own post-Cold 
War experience in Somalia. Even if such a manual is developed, it will be critical not to 
Iss USSOCOM is legislatively mandated authority and responsibility to develop joint 
special operations doctrine. 
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become locked into doctrinal dogma, but to maintain doctrinal flexibility. Afterall, each 
urban complex, enemy threat, and culture in which we operate will provide different and 
unique challenges which will call for imagination and inventiveness on the part of 
commanders. As these case studies demonstrate, those who fell back on firepower and 
brute force, traditional staples of conventional operations, only complicated and even 
compromised their missions in urban stability and support operations. 
What does ARSOF, particularly SF, bring to the table when considering stability 
and support operations in an urban environment? First and foremost, it affords a "small 
presence" force in an already confmed and overcrowded city, with a language capability 
and extensive training in cross-cultural communication skills. ARSOF will want to 
expand its thinking on cross-cultural communication to urban versus rural cultures. 
Within any one culture, there are a number of sub-cultures that will have an impact on 
Civil Military Operations (CMO). These skills are critical in working with the populace, 
host nation military and police forces, and in the case of a multi-national operation, 
liaison with foreign forces. 
SF are more thoroughly trained on close quarters combat (CQC) techniques than 
conventional units. These discriminate and precise firing techniques are essential in 
urban operations, with their restrictive ROE, to limit collateral damage and civilian 
casualties. Not only are these skills important in conducting a unilateral direct action 
missions, but also they will become critical in the training of foreign military and police 
forces, which in many cases are inclined to use excessive force in achieving their aims. 
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SF will have to consider seriously the effects of urbanization and the impact 
urbanization will have on its missions and collateral activities. For example, the 
approach to special reconnaissance (SR) operations in urban areas will differ 
significantly from those in a rural setting in which SF is accustomed to operating. The 
current SR manual, FM 31-20-5 dedicates a single page to urban operations. This clearly 
is insufficient in addressing the constraints the urban area poses which includes different 
modes and methods of infiltration and exfiltration, communications, resupply, and 
equipment. 
The FID mission takes on a different character in an urbanizing world. We can 
expect host nations to increasingly ask for more assistance in dealing with urban 
problems. This means that SF teams will be asked to train foreign armies and police 
forces on CQC type skills. The countries will need more training than shooting and room 
clearing skills. They will need training and assistance in planning and coordinating an 
integrated urban campaign--an area which the U.S. Army is also lacking. 
The intelligence war was the most important aspect of urban operations in each of 
the previous case studies. In all three situations, the military faced the problem of trying 
to distinguish the enemy from the population. Each army in these case studies began 
operations after a weak and inefficient police failed to achieve dominance in the 
intelligence war. The police had failed to establish adequate intelligence networks 
within the populace. All three armies carried out little intelligence planning prior to 
assumption of control of the urban areas. The French, Uruguayan, and British militaries 
were forced to create ad hoc intelligence organizations to meet their needs. Some armies 
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adapted better than others. The French in Algiers tried to employ technology to offset 
their inability to collect needed information. They soon learned that their new "signals" 
technology did very little against a low-tech enemy like the FLN. The coordinated efforts 
of the various branches of the Uruguayan military, as well as the police, greatly enhanced 
their tactical effectiveness. Like the French, the Uruguayan and British Army all out 
quest for intelligence led them to questionable tactics and methods for acquiring 
information that undermined the political goals. 
The United States is experiencing many of the same phenomena that the armies 
in the case studies experienced. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army is 
undergoing fiscal and personnel constraints that have adversely affected the intelligence 
community, much like the French and British armies did at the time of the outbreak of 
their respective conflicts. Just as the French and British did, the United States is 
searching for answers to many of these type problems through advancements in 
technology. 
In the area of intelligence collection in an urban environment, SF could be 
utilized as a force multiplier. There is an expanded need for information and intelligence 
in an urban environment that technology cannot fill, particularly when operating against a 
"low-tech" or asymmetrical enemy. SF provides the potential to expand the human 
intelligence (HUMJNT) collection capability. Each case demonstrated that intelligence 
collection worked best when it is part of a coordinated intelligence effort between the 
military and the police. As previously mentioned, SF offers the potential to expand the 
capability but that would require a restructuring of Operations and Intelligence (O&I) 
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type courses SF soldiers currently attend as well as investigating of any current legal 
limitations. 
Although there was only a cursory examination of psychological operations 
(PSYOPS) in this study, it was evident that each army increased its consideration of it at 
some point in the conflict. It was not until after the "Battle of Algiers" that PSYOP units 
began arriving in Algeria. The PSYOP campaign started late in both Uruguay and in the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, but most analysts agree that its impact was substantial. This 
is certainly worthy of further research and follow-on study. 
U.S. PSYOP forces will increasingly be called upon in urban areas and will have 
complex issues to address. To its advantage, urban areas offer PSYOP force the 
"concentration effect" with access to large numbers of people in a confined area with the 
added benefit of increased mediums through which to conduct operations. Paradoxically, 
the concentration of diverse ethnic and religious groups that compose a Third World city 
may provide additional problems as well. PSYOP themes that work on one segment of 
the population, may have unwanted effects on another. Overlapping of target audiences 
may lead to more generic themes, making them less effective. Also, the "concentration 
effecf' can work to the enemy's advantage, particularly if they can get the media 
involved. There is likely to be more media in the cities than in rural areas. It likely to 
become harder to enforce press pools there. 
Civil Affairs was important in the French and the Uruguayan cases. The 
development of the SAUs in Algiers provided a vital link to the civil population but 
' 
found out quickly that much of their effectiveness was lost because it was not integrated 
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into other aspects of the urban campaign. In Uruguay, the CA functions that the army 
performed prior to assuming full control of the mission were important in maintaining 
relations between the Uruguayan military and the population of Montevideo. As CA 
functions fell to the wayside upon taking over the mission, so did their relationship with 
the people. 
Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers will also be increasingly important in future urban 
campaigns. Urban areas, with its more complex sub-systems necessitates an increased 
capacity for CA assets to carry out CMO. CA has many of the same considerations as 
that of PSYOPS in regard to "concentration." The concentration of the masses can 
provide an advantage in that actions conducted by CA personnel and host nation 
personnel can be observed by many, enhancing the effectiveness of showing that the 
regime is attempting to look after the needs of the population: assisting in providing food, 
shelter, sanitation, and potable water. Paradoxically, this concentration of people will 
complicate the solutions of providing the basic necessities to the populace. This could 
present a logistical problem in which the regime is incapable of supporting, or that 
United States is unwilling to support. 
In all three cases, training to prepare soldiers for the urban environment was 
inadequate. Much like Krepinevich's "Army Concept" argument, each nation had a 
" ... perception of how wars out to be waged and is reflected in the way it organizes and 
trains .... " 156 ARSOF training for future urban operations will have to see an increased 
emphasis if we are thoroughly to prepare soldiers to meet conditions of future conflict 
156 Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986) 5. 
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Not only should ARSOF courses taught at the JFKSWCS focus more on urban 
operations, but training should emphasize more urban operations. Providing for a 
realistic training environment is one of the most immediate challenges, because 
replicating the crowded conditions of today' s Third World cities is extremely difficult. 
The sheer crush of humanity on an urban street is one of the most disorienting aspects for 
an ARSOF soldier trained to fight in rural areas. Technology may have its most 
immediate impact on urban operations in the area of training. Virtual reality simulation 
devices under development can simulate urban environments while interacting with the 
populace. Ralph Peters suggestion for an Urban National Training Center should also be 
looked at more closely. Although this thesis does not attempt to provide all the solutions, 
it has attempted to identify serious shortcomings in U.S. MOUT and Stability and 
Support Operations doctrine and training and to illustrate the potentially serious 
consequences of these shortcomings. 
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